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Abstract
We analyze the impact of individuals’ self-attribution biases on the formation
of teams in the workplace. We consider a two periods model in which workers
jointly decide whether to form a team or work alone. We assume workers’
abilities are unknown. Agents update their beliefs about abilities after receiv-
ing a signal at the end of the first period. We show that allowing workers
to learn about their abilities undermines cooperation when a fixed allocation
of the group outcome is assumed. Consistent with the latter finding, we es-
tablish that making learning about workers’ abilities less accessible increases
workers’ cooperation and welfare. When workers suffer from self-serving at-
tribution, cooperation among agents is undermined whatever the allocation
rule considered for the group outcome. We analyze possible solutions to insuf-
ficient teamwork. We find that team contracts based on a revelation game can
improve cooperation as well as the presence of a manager in the team. Full
efficiency is however never achieved. Our paper establishes a basic framework
to analyze necessary psychological conditions for individuals to form teams.
We apply our model to coauthorship and to organizational issues.
1 Introduction
We analyze the impact of individuals’ self-serving attribution on the formation
of teams in the workplace. Workers suffering from self-serving biases tend
to learn more positively about their ability than about others’ abilities, for
example by ignoring with some probability negative signals about their own
ability.1 The issue in our framework is that the information revealed about
team members’ abilities will be interpreted differently by coworkers suffering
from self-attribution biases. As a result, conflicts in beliefs will arise and
lead teams to split. Anticipating such an effect, individuals may not want to
form teams. We consider a two periods model in which workers jointly decide
whether to form a team or work alone. We assume workers’ abilities are
unknown. Agents update their beliefs about abilities after receiving a signal
at the end of the first period. We find that as long as the group outcome is
equally split among workers, the formation of teams in the workplace is less
likely when agents have the possibility to learn about their abilities. This
is the case since a rigid allocation rule like equal splitting does not provide
the adequate incentives for continuing with the team project when coworkers
receive asymmetric signals about their abilities. The worker receiving good
news about his own ability will ask for a bigger share of the group outcome at
time 1. When workers suffer from self-serving attribution, cooperation among
agents is undermined whatever the allocation rule considered for the group
outcome. As a result, no renegotiation-proof contracts can be designed to
implement the efficient teams outcome (ETO). This is the case since in the
presence of self-serving biases workers may not agree on the perceived ability
of coworkers. Consequently, allocation rules permitting to reach a maximum
level of cooperation in the case of rational workers may lead agents to work
separately in the presence of self-serving biases even if there exists positive
synergies for working as a team. Workers’ welfare is negatively affected by
team members’ learning biases since optimal teams are not always formed as a
result. The argument is that agents may not work as a group in the first period
because they anticipate that biased coworkers (or they themselves) will more
frequently leave the group after learning the outcome of the team project at
the end of the first period. Ending the team in the second period implies a cost
for the team workers since they will lose the positive effect on the marginal
product of effort due to undertaking twice the same project. We analyze
possible solutions to insufficient team formation and show how cooperation
can be improved by team contracts based on a revelation mechanism or by
the introduction of a manager in the team. We stress as well the importance
of controlling the flows of information accessible to workers and the relevance
of investments in social capital. Our paper establishes a basic framework to
analyze necessary psychological conditions for individuals to form teams. We
apply our model to coauthorship and organizations.
1 In the rest of the paper we will use equivalently the terms self-serving attribution and
self-serving learning.
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A number of researchers have studied the role of behavioral factors as a
possible solution to free riding arising in teams when efforts of the group mem-
bers are not observable.2 Rotemberg (1994) shows how altruism can improve
workers’ cooperation and welfare when complementarities exist between team
members. Kandel and Lazear (1992) show how peer pressure can increase
cooperation among workers. This is the case because exerting more effort
workers can reduce the negative effects of peer pressure. Although improving
workers’ cooperation, a high level of peer pressure in a team can reduce work-
ers’ expected utility. Gervais and Goldstein (2004) find that workers’ biased
self-perception facilitates cooperation among agents. The argument is that an
overconfident agent overestimates his marginal product of effort leading him-
self and his coworker to exert more effort in the team. As long as the degree
of self-confidence of the biased coworker is not too high, both the rational
and the overconfident workers benefit from an increase in the degree of biased
self-perception of the overconfident agent.
Our paper differs from the ones previously mentioned since by assuming
observability of coworkers’ actions we eliminate free riding issues. We consider
the most favorable case for workers’ cooperation considering teams with a
sufficiently close level of collaboration such that agents’ performances and
actions are observable. Given favorable conditions for workers’ cooperation:
no moral hazard and asymmetry of information issues, we analyze in sections
3 to 5 (except 5.3) how learning about agents’ abilities affects the formation of
teams in the workplace. Issues related to private information are analyzed in
sections 5.3 and 6. In opposition to Gervais and Goldstein (2004), we establish
that workers’ biased self-perception has a negative impact on cooperation in
the workplace. In our work, we analyze cooperation defined as the decision
of team formation whereas Gervais and Goldstein analyzes the level of effort
undertaken by agents assuming a team is formed.
Other recent works have started to analyze team issues in the absence of
moral hazard. Eaton and Hollis (2003) analyze teamwork when agents have
private information about their own opportunities. They show that asym-
metry of information among team members leads to insufficient teamwork
and they justify the use of incentives schemes that "over-reward" joint work.
Ishida (2005) focus on information asymmetry between the principal and team
members. At each period, team members observe if an opportunity for col-
laboration is available. The principal is not able to observe such information
and is then unable to interpret the non collaboration among workers as the
absence of an opportunity for collaboration. In a repeated setting, the author
justifies the use of low-powered incentives for individual work from the point
of view of the principal. Under such incentives schemes the principal creates a
motive for workers to build a reputation for being cooperative and facilitates
peer monitoring. A very short summary of the issues considered in articles
analyzing team issues is available in the next table.
2Free riding issues in teams have been studied in numerous articles such as Holmstrom
1982, Itoh 1991 or Che and Yoo 2001
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Assumptions /
Authors
Hidden
actions
Hidden
information
Behavioral
elements
Holmstrom (1982)
Itoh (1991)
Che and Yoo (2001)
×
Eaton and Hollis (2003)
Ishida (2005)
×
Kandel and Lazear (1992)
Rotemberg (1994)
Gervais and Goldstein (2004)
× ×
Corgnet (2005), sections 3, 4, 5.2 and 5.4 ×
Corgnet (2005), sections 5.3 and 6 × ×
Focusing on agents self-serving attribution is motivated by a widespread
evidence in Psychology literature showing that people tend to take credit for
successes but deny responsibility for failure (Bradley 1978, Miller and Ross
1975, Zuckerman 1979). Individuals tend to process information in a distorted
and motivated way in order to enhance one’s self-perception (Fiske and Taylor
1991, Nisbett and Ross 1980). As noted by Gilbert et al.(1998):
"Psychologists from Freud to Festinger have described the artful
methods by which the human mind ignores, augments, transforms
and rearranges information in its unending battle against the af-
fective consequences of negative events."3
There is an extensive evidence as well that people recall their successes
better than their failures (Korner 1950, Silverman 1964, Mischel, Ebbesen
and Zeiss 1976). Such a selective memory leads agents to hold excessively
positive beliefs about themselves (Greenwald 1980) and to see themselves as
above average (Svenson 1981 and Cooper, Woo and Dunkelberg 1988). Biases
in inference and attribution have been mostly interpreted in the psychology
literature as motivational biases. Agents are considered to feel better-off
learning in a way that improves their self-image. As an example of motivated
learning, we consider in section 3 workers ignoring negative signals about their
abilities with some positive probability whereas positive signals are correctly
processed. We assume that agents update as a Bayesian inferrer the infor-
mation actually processed, this corresponds to "quasi-Bayesian" learning as
defined in Rabin (2002).4 Such learning rules in which agents misread or mis-
remember the signals they observe but apply Bayes’ rule have been used for
example to explain financial anomalies and in particular over- and underreac-
tion in asset prices (Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny 1998, Daniel and Hirshleifer
3 I found this quotation thanks to Roland Bénabou.
4 "A person is modeled as having a specific form of misreading of the world meant to
correspond to a heuristic error, but then is assumed to operate as a Bayesian given this
misreading." Rabin (2002).
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1998). Rabin and Schrag (1999) have used quasi-Bayesian learning to analyze
the effect of confirmatory bias, they show how individuals suffering from such
a bias can become overconfident.
In section 2 we present and solve our model in the case of rational cowork-
ers. We analyze the model with biased self-attribution in the third section. In
section 4, we study the impact of information on team formation and cowork-
ers’ expected welfare. In section 5, we consider the issue of bargaining. We
analyze in section 6, how team contracts can be used to foster team formation.
Section 7 focuses on the role of team managers. We discuss applications of
our model in section 8. Section 9 concludes. All proofs are available in the
appendix.
2 The benchmark model
In this section, we analyze the benchmark framework in which workers are
assumed to be Bayesian inferers.
2.1 Assumptions
We consider the case of two workers deciding jointly whether to complete an
individual or a team project. The team project is undertaken only if both
workers agree to do so.
We do not take into consideration moral hazard and signalling issues as-
suming that workers have access to common knowledge prior information and
are able to observe others’ actions and performances whether they form a
team or not. The latter assumption discussed in the next subsection and in
appendix B permits to focus our attention on the impact of Bayesian and
self-serving learning on workers’ decision to form teams.
We assume a two periods decision problem. At time 0, the two cowork-
ers decide simultaneously whether to undertake the individual or the group
project. At the end of the first period the outcome of the project chosen
at time 0 is observed by both workers. At time 1, agents decide whether to
continue with the project undertaken in the first period. The outcome asso-
ciated to the project performed in the second period is observed at time 2.
The sequence of decisions as well as the payoffs of the individual and team
projects are represented in figure 1, where q∗ stands for the prior expected
ability of the workers.
The team members do not know his and other’s abilities necessary to
undertake the projects. Workers update their beliefs about abilities at the
end of the first period after observing the outcome of the project chosen in
the first period. We assume the participation constraint is satisfied so that
expected utility for both the individual and team projects are always higher
than the payoffs of not working. The workers are always better-off exerting
effort so that their decision is not about working or not working but about
working alone or as a team. We assume agents are risk neutral, they select
their projects by maximizing expected payoffs. The risk neutrality assumption
4
Time 0
Time 1
Possible payoffs: {g(G+B)/2, gG, gB} 
Probabilities: {2q*(1-q*),q*²,(1-q*)²}Team
Alone Possible payoffs: {G,B} 
Probabilities: {q*,(1-q*)}
Team
Alone
Alone
Team
Time 2
Possible payoffs: {gf(G+B)/2, gfG, gfB} 
Probabilities: {2q*(1-q*),q*²,(1-q*)²}
Possible payoffs: {G, B} 
Probabilities: {q*,(1-q*)}
Possible payoffs: {fG, fB} 
Probabilities: {q*,(1-q*)}
Possible payoffs: {g(G+B)/2, gG, gB} 
Probabilities: {2q*(1-q*),q*²,(1-q*)²}
Figure 1: Payoffs tree
simplifies calculations. An agent i ∈ {1, 2} when working alone undertakes a
project that is a success (failure) with probability qi (1 − qi) and delivers
a payoff XRI,i,t = [R (− 1) + 1]G ([R (− 1) + 1]B).5 We assume in the
rest of the paper without loss of generality that G = 1 and B = 0. We
denote R the number of times the project has been previously undertaken,
R ∈ {0, 1}. That is, we assume that when a project is repeated its expected
value is multiplied by  ≥ 1. As you work more time on a project you develop
abilities specific to that project in addition to your initial level of ability on
the task (qi). The subscript t corresponds to time where t ∈ {0, 1, 2}, we drop
the time subscript when not necessary. The outcomes of the two individuals’
projects are assumed to be independent. If workers choose to form a team,
they are involved in a project that delivers the following payoff to each worker:
XRG,t = [R (− 1) + 1]
(XI,1,t+XI,2,t)
2 . The total outcome of the group project
([R (− 1) + 1]  (XI,1,t +XI,2,t)) is shared equally among coworkers. The
parameter  represents synergies obtained for working in a team, the higher
 the higher the synergies,  is known by the workers at time 0 and assumed
to be positive. The absence of synergies corresponds to  = 1, that is the
team project total outcome is the sum of the individual projects outcomes.
Strictly speaking synergies are defined by Γ ≡  − 1. We assume a beta
prior distribution for individual abilities: qi ∼ Beta(,).6 We consider
no discount factors, the effect of discounting would be to reduce the role of
learning about workers’ abilities at time 1.7
5We denote XI,i,t =
XR
I,i,t
R(−1)+1 .
6The beta prior assumption is convenient since the beta distribution is a conjugate
prior for the binomial problem considered here (Box and Tiao 1973). In addition, beta
distributions can approximate any reasonably smooth unimodal distribution on [0, 1] (Lee
1997).
7A low discount factor would not be consistent with our aim since we want to consider
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2.2 Comments on the assumptions
Instead of assuming perfect observability of coworkers’ performances, it may
appear more natural to assume that workers learn more about their partner
when they form a team with him. We may consider that workers are able
to observe others’ performances only when they form a team. This leads
to a theoretically more complex game in which workers may decide to hide
bad news about their abilities in order to signal themselves as high ability
coworkers. We analyze such a game in appendix B in which both workers
decide simultaneously whether to form a team or work alone. We find that
propositions (1 & 2) are not modified for any of the multiple equilibria of
the game. This is the case since the conditions for team formation at time 0
crucially depend on the conditions for team formation at time 1 after a team
has been formed at time 0. Since the latter conditions do not change given
that coworkers’ performances are assumed to be mutually observable in the
team, the conditions for team formation at time 0 are unchanged.
Concerning the risk neutrality assumption, we have to mention that taking
into account risk aversion is likely to strengthen our results. The idea is that
as self-serving biases increase, uncertainty about team continuation at time
1 increases so that the negative impact on workers’ cooperation of biased
learning will be higher for risk averse agents.
Rather than assuming the presence of a learning by doing effect (), we
can rewrite our standard model considering a fixed cost C > 0 for shifting
from the individual (team) project to the team (individual) project at time
1.8 The main results of our paper are not modified by introducing costs of
shifting from one type of project to another instead of considering learning
by doing effects.9
The equal splitting allocation rule is justified by the fact that at time 0
workers have the same prior beliefs. However, at time 1 updated workers’
abilities may differ leading to bargaining opportunities. We assume in this
section and in sections 3 and 4 that agents commit at time 0 to the equal
splitting rule, alternative allocation rules are considered in sections 5 and 6.
We consider in our model a situation in which workers have the possibility
to leave the team at time 1, there exists however cases in which agents may
attempt to commit at time 0 to continue with the project started at time 0.
We have to stress that commitment at time 0 may be broken at time 1 if one
of the two workers has an interest to do so. In our framework commitment
is not credible, this happens in many real life situations in which an exante
agreement can be ended without further costs. We consider such examples in
the case of the academic profession in section 8. Two coauthors may not be
able to credibly commit to continue working together since they know that
projects for which learning and then self-serving biases matter.
8You may assume that there is a fixed cost to pay for undertaking a project. You do not
have to pay such a cost if you repeat the same type of project in the second period.
9 In Appendix C, the conditions for team formation are established for this alternative
specification of our model.
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one of the researchers can break the agreement at a low cost. The author
who decides to leave the joint enterprise believes that cooperation was not
profitable so that reputation costs that would threaten future joint work is
reduced. Evidently, costs of reputation may be much higher if the coauthors
are jointly involved in other projects or if the reputation of one coauthor can
be communicated cheaply to other possible coauthors.10
2.3 Analysis of team formation
We solve the benchmark model by backward induction, establishing first the
optimal conditions for team formation at time 1 given the history of signals
and the project undertaken at time 0. The conditions for team formation
at time 0 are derived in proposition 1 given the optimal decisions taken by
workers at time 1. We denote qB = E [qi | XI,i,1 = B] = ++1 and qG =
E [qi | XI,i,1 = G] = +1++1 .
Proposition 1 At time 0, the condition for team formation is:  ≥ 
∗ > 1, where ∗ =

(1+)(2++2)+(2+1)
(1+)(2++2)+(2+1)
for  < ∗
2
(1+ +1)
for ∗ ≤  < ∗

 ≥ 1, for  ≥ ∗

Where ∗ =
2++2+
q
(2++2)
2
+4(2++2+2+)
2
((2+1)2+2+1)
2(2++2+2+)(2+1)
and
∗ = 21+ 
+1
.
Given the optimal decisions of coworkers at time 1, agents will form a team
at time 0 as long as synergies are sufficiently high.11 A necessary condition
for team formation at time 0 is  > 1 so that positive synergies are required
for agents to work together. The ETO in our model is obtained if teams
are formed at time 0 and continued at time 1 whenever there exists positive
synergies.12 We call efficient teams equilibrium (ETE) an equilibrium that
implements the efficient teams outcome. As it clearly appears in figure 2,
teams characterized by strictly positive synergies ( > 1) may not always be
formed at time 0 according to proposition 1. This is a consequence of two
important assumptions. First, the probability of losing the learning effect of
undertaking twice the same projects is higher when choosing the team project
than when working alone. The latter comes from the assumption that the
10We consider the issue of reputation in another paper Corgnet (2005c).
11Using backward induction the equilibrium stated in proposition 1 is subgame-perfect
since we consider a finite game with perfect information. Notice that the strategy consisting
in never forming a team constitutes a Nash equilibrium of the subgame at time 1. As a result,
there exists other subgame-perfect Nash equilibria than the ones captured in proposition 1.
However, the latter equilibria are not considered in the rest of the paper since we want to
analyze the decisions of coworkers when at least some degree of cooperation is possible (See
appendix B).
12The efficient outcome is the expected payoffs a benevolent social planner would obtain
by maximizing aggregate welfare.
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agreement of the two coworkers is necessary for team formation. Assuming a
team has been formed at time 0, it can split at time 1 either because of worker
1 or because of worker 2 whereas the individual projects are not continued
only if both coworkers at the same time agree to do so. To compensate for this
effect, coworkers at time 0 will require strictly positive synergies to engage
in the formation of a team. The second important assumption underlying
proposition 2 is the equal splitting rule.13 Such a rigid allocation rule prevents
workers receiving better news about abilities from obtaining a bigger share
of the group outcome. A rigid allocation rule is a rule decided at time 0
and maintained at time 1 independently of the signals received. The first
proposition holds for any rigid allocation rules. This is the case since the
equal splitting rule is at time 0 the most favorable allocation rule for workers’
cooperation given that agents prior abilities are identical. As a result, if teams
characterized by positive synergies are not formed under the equal splitting
rule they will not be formed under any other rigid allocation rules. Our first
proposition is closely related to the result obtained by Farrell and Scotchmer
(1988). The authors analyze the formation of coalitions in a population of
N agents. The members of a coalition are assumed to share the output of
the group equally. They consider a static model in which no learning about
abilities occur, the role of synergies () is played by the economies of scale
associated to the size of a coalition. Our model can be seen as a dynamic
version of the framework of Farrell and Scotchmer (1988) when N = 2. The
authors conclude that in equilibrium the sizes of coalitions are too small.
This result is driven as in our model by the combination of agents differing
in abilities (this occurs in our model at time 1) and equal splitting of the
group outcome. Most able agents are reluctant to form coalitions with less
able workers because of the equal splitting of the group outcome.
We show in section 5 that under the relative ability sharing rule, posi-
tive synergies is a sufficient condition for team formation at time 0 in the
benchmark model. As shown in figure 1, the threshold for team formation
is non-monotonic in the learning by doing effect , it is increasing in  for
1 ≤  < ∗ and decreasing for ∗ ≤  < ∗, where ∗ stands for the level
of learning by doing such that ∗ =
(1+)(2++2)+(2+1)
(1+)(2++2)+(2+1)
and ∗ is taken
such that ∗ = 1. At  = 1 and  = 
∗ the threshold for team formation
takes its minimum value of 1. For low values of  ( < ∗), an increase in
 leads workers to require more synergies to accept team formation at time
0. This occurs because the probability that learning by doing effects are lost
at time 1 is higher for the team project than for the individual project. This
is the case because the agreement of the two workers is required to form a
team. For sufficiently large values of  ( ≥ ∗) the latter effect is more than
compensated by the fact that an increase in  has a more positive impact on
the expected output of the team project than on the expected output of the
13As will appear clearly in section 5, the equal splitting rule is a necessary assumption to
obtain insufficient teamwork.
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Figure 2: Threshold for team formation at time 0 (∗) as a function of learning
by doing ().
individual project as long as synergies are positive ( ≥ 1). As a result, for
 ≥ ∗, an increase in  will lead workers to be less demanding in terms of
synergies to form a team at time 0.
3 The biased self-attribution model
3.1 The self-serving attribution case
3.1.1 Assumptions
In this section we consider that workers suffer from biases in their learning
process whether they work alone or in a team.14 Motivated learning as men-
tioned in the introduction can be seen as Bayesian learning with imperfect
processing of negative signals. As presented in the first section, psychologists
have found extensive evidence that agents tend to recall and process their suc-
cesses more easily than their failures (Korner 1950, Silverman 1964, Mischel,
Ebbesen and Zeiss 1976). Researchers have found that positive personality
information is efficiently processed whereas negative personality information
is poorly processed (Kuiper and Derry 1982, Kuiper and MacDonald 1982,
Kuiper et al. 1985). We introduce inferences biases by assuming that workers
ignore bad signals about their ability with probability p. Our assumption
implies a different treatment of bad and good signals, such an asymmetry in
the learning process is what we refer to as motivated or self-serving learn-
ing. Workers are more easily tempted to ignore bad signals than good signals
about their abilities in order to build a positive self-image. Through time,
above average effects will arise in which workers will see themselves as more
talented than others. The latter effects will generate a dispersion in cowork-
ers’ beliefs about one’s and other’s abilities. Differences in perceptions about
abilities will lead agents to break teams. The learning process considered
in this section is described in assumption 1. Workers are assumed to suffer
from self-serving attribution mistakenly interpreting bad signals about their
abilities as the result of bad luck rather than being the result of insufficient
14Assuming that self-serving biases only arise when workers are in a team would strenghten
our results by increasing the negative impact of learning biases on team formation.
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talent. A worker believes with probability p that bad news are uninformative
about his ability and decide to ignore such information.15
Assumption 1 (self-serving learning)
A worker suffering from self-serving attribution biases will update his
ability as a Bayesian inferrer suffering from imperfect information process-
ing. The updating rule is described as follows, ∀i ∈ {1, 2}: Ei,S [qi | XI,i = G] = E [qi | XI,i = G]Ei,S [qi | XI,i = B] = E [qi | XI,i = B] with probability (1− p)
Ei,S [qi | XI,i = B] = E [qi] with probability p

A worker updates his coworker’s ability as a Bayesian inferrer.
We denote Ei,S the expected workers’ abilities as computed by worker
i taking into account that with probability p the agent suffers from biased
information processing.16 We introduce a subscript i for the expectation of
worker i since when learning biases are present coworkers’ expectations may
not coincide. We assume that the two coworkers suffer from learning biases.
We denote Π the probability that at least one of the two workers exhibit
self-serving biases at time 1, by construction: Π = 2p− p2 as long as the bi-
ases suffered by the two workers are taken to be independent. The inference
process described above can be referred to as self-enhancing since it leads
agents to believe they are more talented than they really are. According to
our learning process, workers are assumed to update their beliefs about one’s
and other’s abilities differently. Agents are Bayesian inferers when updat-
ing others’ abilities but assumed to suffer from self-serving attribution biases
when updating their own ability. There is evidence in the psychology liter-
ature that individuals see themselves more positively than they are seen by
others. For example, Lewinsohn et al. (1980) compared the ratings made
by observers and by college students themselves about personality charac-
teristics like friendliness, warmth and assertiveness of students involved in a
group interaction task. They found that self-ratings were significantly more
positive than observers’ ratings. In our framework, workers being closer to
each other by forming a team, self-serving biases may arise as well in learning
about one’s coworker’s ability. We consider for simplicity the case in which
team workers do not suffer from learning biases in assessing others’ ability.
The results of this section would still hold as long as self-serving biases in as-
sessing one’s ability are more pronounced than in estimating one’s coworker’s
ability. A discussion of this assumption is provided in sections 8.1.3 and 8.2.1.
This is the case since our inference process leads workers to overestimate their
contribution to the team outcome.
15The information received by the worker at time 1 is however always informative about
his ability. We do not model explicitly the fact that some signals may be uninformative.
16Alternatively, we can consider the case of two agents with different degrees of self-serving
attribution: p1 6= p2. The results derived below continue to hold taking p = Max {p1; p2}
and Π = p1 + p2 (1− p1).
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Another important element of our quasi-Bayesian learning process model
concerns the degree with which workers are aware of their biases. A span of
possible assumptions about the level of awareness about coworkers biases is
considered below.
Assumption 2 (awareness of biases)
Assumption 2a: (the naive case). Workers are unaware of neither their
learning biases nor their coworker’s biases.
Assumption 2b: (asymmetric awareness of biases). Workers are un-
aware of their learning biases but aware of their coworker’s biases.
Assumption 2c [2c’]: (partial [full] awareness of biases). Workers are
aware of their coworker’s biases as well as their own biases and know that
a worker’s biases are recognized at time 1 with probability  < 1 [ = 1].
A first possibility is to consider that workers are naive inferers totally un-
aware of their biases. In this case the effect of learning biases will not translate
to the formation of teams at time 0. As many teams will be formed at time 0
in the biased learning and in the Bayesian learning cases but more teams will
be split at time 1 in the case learning biases are introduced. An alternative
assumption is to consider an asymmetry in awareness of biases. Workers may
recognize that others tend to learn positively about themselves without seeing
themselves as suffering from such a bias. As argued in Gilbert et al.(1998)
people are able to deceive themselves as long as they are not fully aware of the
incentives they have to do so. As a result, people willing to build a positive
self-image are unlikely to be fully aware of their biases whereas they may be
fully aware of others’ biases as long as they are not interested in building a
positive image of others. In our model, under assumption 2c workers are able
to recognize their biases with probability  (we assume for simplicity that
the degree of awareness  is identical for both workers), as long as  < 1 the
effects of learning biases at time 1 are not fully eliminated. Finally, we can
refer to the case studied in Bénabou and Tirole (2002) in which workers are
fully aware of their learning biases.17 Full awareness of biases (assumption
2c
0
) is of no interest in the present model since for  = 1 the effects of learning
biases entirely disappear. We analyze in appendix D a variant of our model
in which there exists a probability of not receiving any signals at time 1. In
that case the effects of learning biases are not fully eliminated since workers
may not be able to recover the true information about their ability. We find
that self-serving biases undermine workers’ cooperation similarly to proposi-
tion 2 stated below. Certainly, the most realistic assumption lies in between
cases 2a and 2c0 implying an intermediate degree of sophistication of agents.
Psychologists have stressed the limited awareness agents have of their mental
processes (Epstein 1983, Gilbert et al.1998). As stated in Fiske and Taylor
(1991):
17Bénabou and Tirole refer to this assumption as metacognition. Their case corresponds
to assumption 2c’.
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"...the process by which self-structures influence the processing of
self-relevant information and subsequent affect and behavior are
largely preconscious without conscious directive activity on the
part of the self."
The former arguments are consistent with assumptions 2a to 2c. Accord-
ing to assumptions 2a-2b, the conditions for team formation at time 1 are
modified compared to the benchmark model if at least one coworker suffers
from self-serving biases, this occurs with probability Π. Assuming 2c, the
conditions for team formation at time 1 are modified if at least one coworker
suffers from self-serving biases and does not realize he is biased, this occurs
with probability Π = 2p (1− )− p2 (1− )2.
3.1.2 Analysis
The model is solved as for the benchmark case by establishing first the condi-
tions for team formation at time 1 and by determining the optimal decisions
of coworkers at time 0 once taken into account their optimal behavior at time
1. Conditions for team formation at time 0 are derived in the appendix and
represented in figure 2. We denote π the variable such that π ≡ p under
assumption 2b and π ≡ Π under assumption 2c. In the rest of the paper,
when not mentioned explicitly, our propositions are derived under both as-
sumptions 2b and 2c. In the next proposition we compare the conditions for
team formation at time 0 when coworkers are rational and when they suffer
from self-serving attribution.
Proposition 2 If rational coworkers decide not to form a team at time 0,
coworkers suffering from self-serving biases will not form a team at time 0
neither.
There exists a range of values for  and  such that coworkers with self-
serving biases do not form a team at time 0 whereas rational coworkers do.
The proposition states a fundamental result of our paper, that is the
cooperation between coworkers is undermined by self-serving attribution. The
introduction of self-serving learning leads coworkers to interpret information
differently. Agents tend to ignore part of the negative signals they receive
about their abilities whereas updating other’s ability as a Bayesian inferrer.
The direct consequence of this learning process is that workers are likely
to see themselves as contributing more to the success of the team project
than their coworker. As a result, coworkers that formed a team at time 0
will more frequently split the group at time 1 than in the rational model.
Anticipating such an effect, coworkers at time 0 will decide to build teams
under more restrictive conditions than in the rational model. Workers will
require higher levels of synergies to form teams at time 0. There exists levels
of synergies that are not sufficient for team formation in the model with self-
serving biases whereas sufficient for team formation in the rational model. We
have to emphasize that there exists no range of values of synergies such that
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Figure 3: Threshold for team formation at time 0 (∗π) as a function of learning
by doing () when self-serving biases are present. For assumption 2b: π = p
and for assumption 2c, π = Π.
learning biases can have a positive impact on team formation. It may appear
surprising since for very large levels of synergies an increase in the estimate
of one’s ability has a more positive impact on the team project than on the
individual project expected outcome. However, in our model when synergies
are sufficiently high the formation of a team is ensured whether agents suffer or
not from self-serving biases. Biased learning has an impact on team formation
for intermediate values of synergies, that is for B ≤  < ∗ when a team
has been formed at time 0 and 2B ≤  < 2∗ after working alone at time
0. But, for intermediate values of synergies, an increase in one’s estimate
of ability leads to a higher increase in expected outcome for the individual
project than for the team project.
Our proposition holds since the team project is preferred to the individual
project when an increase in workers’ estimate of their ability has a higher effect
on the expected output of the group project. Our proposition is robust to
any synergy functions as discussed in section 5.2 and in appendix A.
Assuming workers possess private information about their own oppor-
tunities, Eaton and Hollis (2003) obtain a result of insufficient teamwork.
Their result depends however on the fact that the team project output of a
worker is independent on his coworker’s ability. If this is not the case, private
information may lead to excessive as well as insufficient teamwork. Con-
sider our benchmark model in which agent’s ability is private information
and both workers have low abilities (qB). At time 1, teamwork will be chosen
for  ≥ 2qBqB+q∗
³

 ≥ 2qBqB+q∗
´
after a team has (not) been formed at time
0.18 Given that 2qBqB+q∗ < 1, teams associated with negative synergies will
be formed. This shows that private information and biased self-attribution
18 In the rest of the paper, when writting  ≥ g
³


≥ g
´
we will refer implicitly to the
case in which a team has (not) been formed at time 0.
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have different consequences on team formation. Biased self-attribution is an
effect that adds to standard informational issues like moral hazard and exante
information asymmetry. In the absence of such informational issues, biased
self-attribution still operates to deter teamwork. In addition, the Biased self-
attribution explanation to insufficient team formation leads to specific recom-
mendations. We analyze in the next sections possible solutions to insufficient
cooperation: the management of information and the selection of projects
(section 4), team contracts for coworkers with self-serving learning (section
6), the role of team managers (section 7), the psychological and cultural selec-
tion of coworkers (section 8.1.3), building social capital and corporate culture
(section 8.2.1).
In our second proposition, we establish that for some range of values of
synergies, the coworkers suffering from self-serving biases make different de-
cisions than in the case of rational coworkers. In particular, workers may not
form teams that would be formed by rational coworkers. Agents are behaving
non optimally for some range of synergy values by refusing to form profitable
teams. The presence of learning biases leads workers to be excessively de-
manding in terms of synergies to accept the formation of teams, this has
a negative effect on coworkers’ expected payoffs. Corollary 1 captures this
intuition.
Corollary 1 The expected welfare of rational coworkers is at least as high
and for a range of values of  and  strictly higher than the expected welfare
of coworkers suffering from self-serving biases.
Consider that risk neutral managers have to select workers for the comple-
tion of a project. Managers’ payoffs are assumed to be a fraction of workers
projects outcomes. The optimal decision for managers consists in selecting
workers with the lowest degrees of self-serving biases. Taking into account that
low self-confidence agents have lower degrees of self-serving biases (Kuiper
and Derry 1982), managers will maximize their expected payoffs by hiring
workers with the lowest self-confidence levels. However, since there is evi-
dence of positive correlation between self-confidence and ability, the selection
of team workers will lead to a trade-off consisting in choosing agents with
high abilities but not excessively high self-confidence.19,20 We obtain results
in apparent opposition to Gervais and Goldstein (2004). In their model they
find that biased self-perception leads workers to increase their level of cooper-
ation. Gervais and Goldstein do not analyze the decision of team formation,
they assume a team has been formed and analyze the optimal level of effort
exerted by team members when workers suffer from biased self-perception. In
their model, biased self-perception facilitates cooperation among workers by
increasing the perceived marginal product of effort. In our model, coworkers’
19There is evidence that experts tend to be more overconfident than relatively inexperi-
enced people (Griffin and Tversky 1992).
20 In section 7, we evoke team managers’ incentives to hire self-serving workers.
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biased self-perception obtained through self-serving learning has a negative
impact on the formation of teams since it creates conflicts in beliefs among
agents. Workers do not form teams sufficiently often leading to a lower ex-
pected utility than in the benchmark model.
4 The impact of information on team formation and cowork-
ers’ expected welfare
In this section, we analyze how the formation of teams and the expected
payoffs of coworkers is modified by the frequency with which information
about workers’ abilities is released at time 1. We consider an alternative
model to the one presented in section 2 in which performances on the projects
completed in the first period are observable at time 1 with probability () and
only observable at the end of the second period with probability (1−).21 The
absence of signals about workers’ abilities at time 1 implies that the decision
for working in a team is the same at times 0 and 1. In the no time 1 signals
model ( = 0), a team will be formed at time 0 if synergies are positive
( ≥ 1). We establish in the next proposition that the expected utility of
coworkers is always at least as high and sometimes strictly higher for sets of
projects with lower signals availability at time 1, that is for sets of projects
characterized by a lower .22
Proposition 3 Whatever 0 ≤ p ≤ 1, coworkers’ expected welfare in a model
with low signals availability (L) is at least as high as the expected welfare of
coworkers in a model with higher signals availability (H > L), and strictly
higher for a range of values of  and .
Our proposition states that receiving information at time 1 about agents’
abilities can never increase coworkers’ expected welfare. The signals received
at time 1, when leading to asymmetric beliefs about agents’ abilities, may
lead one of the two coworkers to stop with the team project undertaken at
time 0. In figure 4, we see that as signals availability increases ( goes up)
the conditions for team formation at time 0 are more demanding in terms of
synergies. As  increases, coworkers’ expected utility will be reduced since
teams with positive synergies will not be formed. The release of signals about
workers’ abilities tends to create heterogeneity in workers’ beliefs, this effect
is even stronger when self-serving biases are considered since then identical
signals about one’s and other’s abilities can be interpreted differently. The
release of signals about workers’ abilities has a negative effect on agents’
welfare since it undermines profitable cooperation. The two workers would
21We assume that the observability of individuals’ performances are perfectly correlated.
This is a simplifying assumption that is not in contradiction with the fact that individual
projects performances are independent. This assumption is relaxed in proposition 4.
22Notice that proposition 3 holds or assumptions 2a and 2c. For assumption 2b (asym-
metric awareness of biases) there may exist a range of values for which coworkers’ expected
welfare is higher when  goes up. For p or  close to 0 proposition 3 holds as well for 2b
(see appendix A).
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Figure 4: Threshold for team formation at time 0 in the case of total signals
availability ( = 1) and in the case of partial signals availability ( < 1),
for p = 0. We denote ∗ the threshold such that  = ∗ where  =
(1+)(+)(++1)−(2+1)
(1+)(+)(++1)−(2+1) .
be better-off ignoring the signals received at time 1. However, given that one
of the worker ignores the signals at time 1 it is optimal for the other worker to
take the signals into account. A possible solution for a manager to maximize
coworkers’ expected payoffs is to design sets of projects in which performances
are observed with delay.
The level of workers’ cooperation is undermined by the possibility of learn-
ing about workers’ abilities, this leaves a role for projects designs fostering
teamwork by limiting signals observability. In order to improve workers’ co-
operation, projects for which no learning about workers’ abilities is possible
should be preferred, especially when coworkers suffer from self-serving biases.
We have assumed up to now that either the two signals were observable or
none of them were. We consider now the case in which one of the two signals
can be observed whereas the other is not. To analyze this case we assume
that the observability of 1 is independent of the observability and 2, where
i,∀i ∈ {1, 2} is the vector of payoffs associated to the time 0 project as
perceived by worker i.23 We denote 0 ≤ i ≤ 1 the probability that signal
i ∈ {1, 2} is observed. We find that the unique scalars 1 and 2 such that
the ETO is attained for any parameters values of  and  are 1 = 2 = 0.
This result is stated in proposition 4, we assume for simplicity the absence of
self-serving biases (p = 0).
Proposition 4 Assuming that the observability of coworkers’ signals is inde-
pendent and denoting i the probability that the signal about worker i’s ability
is observable, the unique scalars 1 and 2 such that the efficient teams out-
come is attained for any parameters ,  of the model are 1 = 2 = 0.
Proposition 4 states that the ETE can only be achieved when no infor-
mation about coworkers’ abilities is provided to agents, this is true even when
23
i ∈ S ≡ {(B,B) , (G,B) , (B,G) , (G,G)}.
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we allow for independence in the observability of coworkers’ signals.
Propositions 3 and 4 establish that as learning becomes less accessible, the
level of synergies required for team formation becomes lower and coworkers’
expected utility is increased.24 Learning has a negative effect on workers’
cooperation since it leads to changes in agents’ beliefs that may induce teams
to split at time 1 when workers stick to rigid allocation rules as for example
equal splitting.
For some projects performances will be automatically observed by the
coworkers so that managers are not able to hide signals about agents’ abili-
ties. Managers may avoid learning by giving workers independent instead of
interdependent projects. In the case of interdependent projects, tasks under-
taken in the first and second periods require the same type of abilities so that
the performance observed at time 1 is informative about one’s ability required
to complete the second period project. In addition, performing twice the same
project (individual or team project) will imply a learning by doing effect .
For the independent set of projects, the first period project performance ob-
served at time 1 will be uninformative about the ability required to complete
the second period project. No learning by doing effect is present in this case
since time 0 and time 1 projects do not require the same kind of abilities.
The sets of independent projects, by preventing workers from learning about
abilities, should be associated with a higher level of cooperation. However, as
 > 1, the expected utility of coworkers need not be higher than in the case
of interdependent projects. We find that for intermediate levels of synergies
and learning by doing effects workers’ expected utility in the independent
projects case is strictly higher than workers’ expected utility in the case of
interdependent projects.25
Another important element that can affect the learning process of cowork-
ers and the level of cooperation among agents is the difficulty of the task. If
we consider an extremely easy project, the learning by doing effect () is
likely to be very close to one. This implies that coworkers will be close to
reach the ETO attained for  = 1. In the case of a very difficult project, the
first period project performance is likely to be uninformative about workers’
abilities so that no learning will occur at time 1, the payoff of the individual
i task can be specified as follows: a + bXI,i for b = 0 so that no learning is
possible. For projects with no learning issues teams will be formed at time 0
for any level of positive synergies ( ≥ 1). Such projects are characterized by
higher levels of workers’ cooperation and expected welfare than projects for
which learning about workers’ abilities is possible.
Finally, notice that the ETO is attained once coworkers use the outcome
of the group project instead of the individual outcomes to update coworkers’
24Further results on the impact of information are obtained in Corgnet (2005b). In
particular, teams are formed more often as prior information becomes sufficiently precise.
25 If  is very close to 1, the benefits for increased team formation are reduced and in-
terdependent projects may be preferred, and if  is very large the effect of learning when
teams are formed will be especially high making interdependent projects more attractive.
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abilities. This learning behavior can be interpreted as the result of a "team
spirit" characterized by the fact that coworkers do not dissociate individual
and group performances in order to assess agents’ abilities. Interestingly this
"team spirit learning" leads workers to ignore part of the information they
receive about coworkers’ abilities to focus only on the group achievements.
The latter is consistent with proposition 3 in which we find that releasing
signals with less frequency leads to more cooperation among workers. In order
to improve coworkers’ cooperation it may not be necessary to hide information
to agents if their learning process is characterized by a "team spirit" that leads
them to regard individual achievements as irrelevant information.
5 The inefficiency result, bargaining and contingent allocation
rules
We have assumed that the equal splitting of the group outcome decided at
time 0 was maintained at time 1. However, in case asymmetric performances
are observed workers’ posterior abilities are different. If worker 1 (2) receives
1 = (G,B) (2 = (B,G)) he will see the equal splitting rule as unfair and
will have an incentive to bargain his share of the group outcome. We analyze
in this section the case of allocation rules that depend on the signals received
by coworkers at time 1, we refer to such rules as contingent allocation rules.
An important assumption used in section 5.2 and 5.4 is that workers do not
attempt to learn about their biases in the bargaining process.26 The case
of sophisticated workers willing to learn about their biases is considered in
section 5.3.
5.1 The benchmark model under the relative ability allocation
rule
We consider an allocation rule under which the share of the group outcome
obtained by an individual is equal to his relative ability. The relative ability
of worker i is defined as: qˆi,tqˆi,t+qˆj,t ∀i, j ∈ {1, 2} ,∀t ∈ {0, 1}. We denote qˆi,t the
level of ability of worker i as updated by a Bayesian inferrer given information
up to time t. Under this allocation rule, worker i’s expected payoffs for a team
project undertaken for the first time is: qˆi,t. The next proposition shows
that, in this case, workers will form teams at time 0 whenever there exists
positive synergies ( ≥ 1). This result still holds if coworkers’ prior abilities
are different as long as both workers agree on the priors.
Proposition 5 Under the relative ability allocation rule and in the absence of
self-serving biases, teams are formed at time 0 whenever synergies are positive.
Our proposition shows that selecting a flexible splitting rule, cooperation
among workers can be increased up to its efficient level. The allocation rule
26 Instead of a bargaining process, one can think that workers are proposed at time 1 a
new allocation rule  selected randomly in the interval [0, 1]. Agents then decide whether
to accept or reject such a rule. In this setting workers do not have the opportunity to learn
about their biases. That way, the allocation rule is flexible but not contingent.
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considered constitutes a Pareto improvement compared to the equal splitting
rule since it rises both workers’ expected welfare. Under the relative ability
allocation rule, propositions 3 and 4 do not hold and the no signals and
signals models lead to the same coworkers’ expected payoffs. We have to
stress however that the results established in section 4 apply to any situation
in which rigid allocation rules are used. There exists many real life examples
in which bargaining is limited. A fixed allocation rule may be optimal when
the costs of implementing a flexible allocation rule are too high. A rule that
can be modified whenever agents receive new pieces of information can be
very costly to implement.
5.2 Self-serving learning, unsophisticated agents and flexible
allocation rules
The negative effect of self-serving biases on team formation does not disappear
under the relative ability allocation rule. Actually, this negative effect may
persist under any allocation rule. We present this intuition by showing that it
may be impossible to establish an allocation rule under which workers perceive
themselves better-off working as a team whereas positive synergies exist. We
consider that both workers suffer from self-serving biases at time 1 and that
the signal received consists of two failures, that is: (XI,1,1,XI,2,1) = (B,B),
1 = (G,B) and 2 = (B,G). The latter occurs a priori with probability
2
(+)2
p2 and
h
2
(+)2
(1− )2 p2
i
under assumptions 2a−2b and [2c]. Denot-
ing qˆji,t the ability of agent i as estimated by agent j at time t, we have by
assumptions: qˆ11,1 = qˆ
2
2,1 =

+ and qˆ
1
2,1 = qˆ
2
1,1 =

++1 . Assuming a team
has been formed at time 0 and denoting i the share of the group outcome
obtained by worker i ∈ {1, 2} (1 + 2 = 1), a team will be formed at time
1 if both workers are better-off working as a team, that is if the following
conditions are satisfied:½
1
¡
qˆ11,1 + qˆ
1
2,1
¢
 ≥ qˆ11,1
 (1− 1)
¡
qˆ21,1 + qˆ
2
2,1
¢
 ≥ qˆ22,1
¾
⇔  ≥
++1
2(+)+1
Min{1;1−1} > 1 since: Min1
++1
2(+)+1
Min{1;1−1} =
2(+)+2
2(+)+1 > 1.
As a result, whatever the sharing rule 1, the condition for team formation
is more demanding in terms of synergies than in theETE since
++1
2(+)+1
Min{1;1−1} >
1,∀ 0 ≤ 1 ≤ 1. Recall that we refer to the ETO as the situation in which
workers are willing to form teams at time 0 whenever there exists positive
synergies. We establish in proposition 6 that as long as at least one coworker
suffers from self-serving biases the level of cooperation reached in the ETE
cannot be attained whatever the splitting rule considered.
Proposition 6 Whatever the allocation rule considered, as long as at least
one coworker suffers from self-serving biases there exists a range of values of
parameters  and  such that the ETO cannot be attained.
Workers’ beliefs diverge once agents suffer from self-serving biases. A
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direct consequence is that even when bargaining is possible and positive syn-
ergies are present, an allocation rule permitting team formation and making
both agents feel better-off may not exist. Moreover, even if such an allocation
exists, it is not unique and workers may not agree on the rule since they have
different beliefs about abilities. As a result, allowing workers to bargain is
not a solution to obtain the ETO once agents suffer from self-serving biases.
In the appendix (proposition 60), we analyze the case in which one of the two
coworkers’ abilities is common knowledge whereas the other coworker suffers
from self-serving biases. Our team inefficiency result first stated in proposi-
tion 2 is robust to flexible allocation rules. It is robust as well to any synergy
function as is established in appendix A.
Our result about the impossibility to find an allocation rule that ensures
a sufficiently high level of cooperation is in line with the experimental results
of Babcock et al.(1995) and Babcock and Loewenstein (1997) in which self-
serving biases tend to prevent defendants and plaintiffs from reaching an
agreement about a settlement. The next corollary states that the negative
effect of self-serving biases on aggregate expected welfare is maintained under
any allocation rules.27
Corollary 2 Whatever the allocation rule considered, the aggregate expected
welfare in the case of self-serving learning is at most as high as in the case of
Bayesian workers using a relative ability allocation rule.
We have shown that when self-serving biases are present, it is impossible
to obtain the maximum level of workers’ cooperation that consists in forming
teams whenever there exists positive synergies. This is so because biased
information processing of at least one coworker implies a divergence in beliefs
among agents. Conflicting beliefs prevent workers from agreeing on a sharing
rule that would make both agents better-off by attaining a higher level of
cooperation. The intuition is that cooperation is undermined either by a
rigidity in allocation rules (e.g: equal splitting) or by a "rigidity in beliefs".
Rigidity in beliefs arise when self-serving biases are introduced since then
agents disagree on workers’ abilities being convinced that they hold the correct
beliefs when it may not be the case.
As a corollary of proposition 6, we show that there exists no long term
commitment contracts implementing the ETO. To do so we define a con-
tract as the share of the group outcome i distributed to worker i at time
1,∀i ∈ {1, 2}. We consider budget balanced contracts (1 + 2 = 1) as well as
contracts involving a third party (1 + 2 + 3 = 1).
28 We use the following
definitions:
Definition 1 A long term commitment contract is such that it can be
renegotiated if all parties agree to do so.29
27The aggregate welfare is the sum of the outcomes obtained by the two workers.
28The group outcome is distributed in its totality to workers. This definition is similar to
the one used in Bartling and von Siemens (2004).
29This definition is taken from Salanié (1997).
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Definition 2 A contract is renegotiation-proof if it is impossible at time
1 to design a new contract that increases the utility of one agent without
reducing the utility of the other agent.
By definition, a long term commitment contract is renegotiation-proof.
Corollary 3 can then be derived from proposition 6.
Corollary 3 In the model with two agents and in the case of a third party,
there exists no long term commitment contracts that can implement the ETO.
According to Corollary 3, it is impossible to design a contract enforcing
the ETO. This is the case because self-serving biases prevent workers from
agreeing on the efficient allocation rule that consists in rewarding agents ac-
cording to their relative ability updated at time 1. In the second part of the
corollary, we extend the result of the initial framework to the presence of a
third agent. The third party is assumed to be able to observe without biases
the outcome of the two coworkers. We show that there exist no long term
commitment contracts implementing the ETO. This is the case since by pe-
nalizing team breaks the third party will be better-off when teams are broken
for a range of positive synergies. As a result, the third agent is exposed to
contracts offers at time 1 from the part of the other two coworkers preventing
the implementation of the ETO for a range of positive synergies.
The results of section 4 still hold under any sharing rules when self-serving
biases are taken into account. The intuition is that signals received at time 1
may lead agents suffering from self-serving biases to hold distinct beliefs about
workers’ abilities. A discrepancy in beliefs among workers will prevent them
from designing an allocation rule leading to the efficient outcome, even in the
set of flexible allocation rules. As a result, making learning about abilities less
accessible will limit beliefs dispersion among workers and improve cooperation
and aggregate welfare.
Instead of considering the case in which coworkers become overconfident
about their abilities as a result of self-serving biases we could assume that
agents suffer from initial overconfidence. Such a model would lead to similar
results concerning the impossibility to find allocation rules implementing the
ETO. Two workers convinced that their ability is above average will have a
different perception of what is a fair allocation for the team outcome. Conse-
quently, they may not find an allocation rule that ensures a sufficiently high
degree of cooperation.
5.3 The inefficiency result with sophisticated agents
5.3.1 Assumptions: the revelation game
In this subsection agents are assumed to be aware of their self-serving biases.
We modify slightly the model presented in section 3 considering that workers
suffering from biased self-attribution misinterpret with probability p bad news
about their ability as being good news. As in the previous sections, workers
update others’ abilities as a Bayesian inferrer.
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Assumption 1” (self-serving learning)
The updating rule is described as follows: Ei,S [qi | XI,i = G] = E [qi | XI,i = G]Ei,S [qi | XI,i = B] = E [qi | XI,i = B] with probability (1− p)
Ei,S [qi | XI,i = B] = E [qi | XI,i = G] with probability p

We consider that workers give a positive to the possibility that they are
biased. Workers will try to learn over their biases and recover the correct
signals about their abilities. Our impossibility result captured in proposition 6
is based on the assumption that workers are unable to recover any information
about their ability in the bargaining process. This behavior is consistent with
assumptions 2a, 2b and 2c. In this section, we assess the robustness of our
impossibility result by considering sophisticated agents of the type considered
in Bénabou and Tirole (2002). The assumption that workers are aware of their
biases is of particular relevance when we consider the issue of contracting.
The process of writing the contract and its implementation will deliver some
information about workers’ biases that are likely to be used by agents in order
to reduce the negative effects of their biases. Assuming that workers assign a
probability zero to the possibility that they are biased would prevent us from
analyzing informational issues associated to the contracting activity.
We define a contract as in section 5.2, that is as the share of the group
outcome i distributed to worker i at time 1,∀i ∈ {1, 2}.30 The set of contracts
analyzed are budget balanced, that is the group outcome is distributed in
its totality to workers (1 + 2 = 1). We considered contracts that can be
contingent on the signals received about workers’ abilities at time 1. The issue
is that workers’ suffering from biased self-attribution may disagree about the
signals received at time 1. To tackle this issue we consider that contracts
are contingent on signals revealed rather than observed by the agents (i).
We modify the initial model by introducing a revelation game after workers
have received signals about their abilities and before they select their second
period project (figure 5).
The revelation game played at time 1 is as follows: at time 1− each
coworker chooses an action ai = (ai1, ai2) that is a message vector formed
of two components that belongs to the set S of possible signals observed at
time 0’. The set S is actually the set of possible types of coworkers. This is
the case since the perception of signals by the agents is private information.31
At time t = 1+ > 1−, workers decide either to continue with the project
selected at time 0 or to undertake the other project.
30The share of the group outcome given to worker 1 at time 1 cannot be contingent. This
is why we do not consider it further.
31The set of possible messages being the set of types, we can use the Revelation Principle
and conclude that our results continue to hold for any message space. The Revelation
Principle can be applied to our model since it can be represented as a normal form game of
a static Bayesian game.
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t=0 t=2
Selecting 
project:
Team or 
individual
t=1
Revelation 
game
t=0’
Payoffs for the 
projects selected 
at time 0
Payoffs for the 
projects selected 
at time 1
Figure 5: Time line for the model with sophisticated agents and a revelation
game
The actions of the two agents will determine the share of the group
outcome given to the first coworker () as a function of the revealed sig-
nals:  ≡  (a11, a12, a21, a22). Given that workers’ assess others’ abilities as
Bayesian inferers, they possess on aggregate the correct information about
their abilities. As a result, we may wonder if allowing workers to commu-
nicate will lead agents to eliminate their learning biases and lead them to
cooperate efficiently.32
5.3.2 The inefficiency result
The result captured in proposition 7 shows that such a conjecture is not
verified, anETE being impossible to achieve for some values of the parameters
 and . Proposition 7 is the counterpart of proposition 6 when agents are
learning about their biases and have the possibility to communicate about
their observed signals through a revelation game.
Proposition 7 There exists no Bayesian Perfect Equilibria (BPE) that im-
plement the ETO for all  and .
Proposition 7 shows that our impossibility result is robust to highly so-
phisticated workers’ behaviors.
5.4 Bargaining power and biased self-attribution
We consider two coworkers, an agent suffering from self-serving learning with
probability p (worker 1) and an unbiased agent (worker 2). The learning be-
havior of the two workers is known to both agents. The unbiased worker,
endowed with the bargaining power, selects at time 0 a non contingent al-
location rule ¯ for the projects undertaken in the first and second periods.
The rest of the assumptions are the same as in the benchmark model and
in particular coworkers are assumed to have the same ability a priori. We
show in the next proposition that the unbiased worker may decide to give
a higher share of the group outcome to the biased worker. We consider the
case in which a team has been formed at time 0. A similar reasoning holds
for the case in which a team has not been formed at time 0. We denote
p¯ =
³
2qG
qB+qG
−
´
(pBBqB+pGGqG)+(1−)(pGBqB+pGBqG)
(−1)pBBqB and P¯ the set of values
32That is to form teams whenever there is positive synergies  ≥ 1.
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satisfying p¯ < 1 for  ∈
h
qB+3qG
2(qB+qG)
, 2qGqB+qG
h
≡ F . For  ∈ F , there always
exists  and  such that P¯ 6= {∅}.
Proposition 8 There exists a range of parameter values
 ∈
h
qB+3qG
2(qB+qG)
, 2qGqB+qG
h
and p > p¯ such that the unbiased worker, endowed
with the bargaining power, prefers to select ¯ = qG(qB+qG) >
1
2 than equal
splitting.
Proposition 8 puts forward that biased coworkers can benefit from their
self-serving learning. In the case in which worker 2 is endowed with the bar-
gaining power and worker 1 is known to be unbiased, the optimal choice for
the second worker is to take ¯ ≤ 12 . The expected payoffs of the first agent are
then higher when he suffers from biased self-attribution (p > 0). For  ∈ F
the ETO is attained when p = 0 so that worker’s 1 expected payoffs in the
equal splitting case is q∗. However, for  ∈ F , p > p¯ > 0 and assuming
worker 2 has the bargaining power, the expected payoffs for worker 1 becomes
¯q∗ > q∗.Our model provides a rational motive for self-serving learning.
The learning biases of a worker function as a credible threat that pushes his
colleague to abandon his bargaining power to ensure sufficient teamwork.
6 Team contracts
To analyze team contracts in details we consider the hypothesis of sophis-
ticated coworkers willing to learn over their biases. This is the adequate
assumption to use since workers are faced with opportunities to learn about
their biases in the contracting process.
In the next proposition we show, using the revelation game presented in
section 5.3, that there exists a pooling equilibrium in which every type of
worker plays the same strategy. This equilibrium leads to team formation
for sufficiently high level of synergies. Under the pooling equilibrium, no
information about workers’ biases is revealed so that agents are unable to
reduce their learning errors. The revelation game is then of no use to improve
cooperation among workers. We denote pG (pB) the probability that XI,i,1 =
G (XI,i,1 = B) ,∀i ∈ {1, 2}.
Proposition 9 For  ≥M ≡Max
n
qˆG
(qB+qˆG)
; qˆG(1−)(qB+qˆG)
o³

 ≥M
´
, there
exists an uninformative BPE that implements the ETO when a team has
(not) been formed at time 0, where qˆG = wqG + (1−w) qB with w = pGpG+ppB
and  (a1, a2) = .
As a consequence of our last result, workers may not always be willing
to play the revelation game at time 0” since they can be better-off by select-
ing an equal splitting rule contract
¡
 = 12
¢
. The intuition is that a truthful
telling equilibrium (TTE) implementing the ETO is attainable only if the
contract specifies rigid allocation rules independent of workers’ types. Un-
der truthful telling, team formation is obtained at best for  ≥ 2qGqB+qG >
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2qˆG
qB+qˆG
³

 ≥ 2qGqB+qG
´
when  = 12 whereas team formation is achieved in the
absence of a revelation game for  ≥ 2qˆGqB+qˆG
³

 ≥ 2qˆGqB+qˆG
´
when  = 12 . For
 ∈
h
2qˆG
qB+qˆG
, 2qGqB+qG
h
≡ H
³

 ∈ H
´
and  = 12 , information revelation will
lead to an equilibrium in which teams are formed only when the signals re-
ceived at time 0’ are symmetric whereas in the absence of a revelation game
teams would always be formed. This proposition implies that full revelation
of information can lead to less team formation than no revelation of informa-
tion.33
Proposition 9 shows how the process of acquiring information about one’s
biases can be costly in terms of cooperation. This stresses how efficient
it can it be to ignore the possibility of one being biased.34 This behavior
would be justified in our case for sufficiently high synergies  ≥ 2qˆGqB+qˆG³

 ≥ 2qˆGqB+qˆG
´
. However, for  < 2qˆGqB+qˆG
³

 <
2qˆG
qB+qˆG
´
and  = 12 , teams are
formed when signals are symmetric (w.p : pBB + pGG) in the TTE whereas
they are formed only when signals are symmetric and no biases have occurred¡
w.p : (1− p)2pBB + pGG
¢
in the absence of a revelation game.35 The follow-
ing corollary captures this result. Being unaware of one’s biases is logically
more detrimental as the intensity of one’s biases increases, that is as p rises.
Corollary 4 The revelation mechanism will be accepted by coworkers as long
as  < 2qˆGqB+qˆG
³

 <
2qˆG
qB+qˆG
´
.
It appears that promoting communication among workers is beneficial in
terms of increased cooperation for sufficiently small levels of synergies. For
high levels of synergies contracts based on rigid allocation rules and no com-
munication mechanisms should be preferred. Corollary 4 stresses how simple
contracts can be favored to more complex ones without assuming differences
in costs of writing and implementation. We show that there exists a psycho-
logical cost to contracting.36 In the next proposition we derive the contracts
leading to the highest degree of team formation when  < 2qˆGqB+qˆG , that is
when contracts based on fixed allocation rules cannot ensure anymore team
formation for positive synergies. We define such contracts before comparing
them in proposition 10. The three contracts stated below
¡
C0TTE
¢
,
¡
C1TTE
¢
and
³
C1
0
TTE
´
are based on a TTE, we use the set S
0
defined as follows:
33Further developments on BPE leading to partial revelation of information are available
in Corgnet (2005b).
34A behaviour that has been observed by psychologists, see Epstein 1983 and Gilbert et
al.(1998).
35We use the following notations: pGG = P [XI,1,1 = G;XI,2,1 = G] and pBB =
P [XI,1,1 = B;XI,2,1 = B].
36This cost arises endogenously. In the literature on Contract Theory and inequity aver-
sion, a psychological cost is directly introduced in the utility function (Englmaier and
Wambach 2002, Bartling and von Siemens 2004, Rey Biel 2004).
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S
0 ≡
½
(q, r, q, r)∀ (q, r) ∈ S, (G,B, k, l)∀ (k, l) ∈ S/ (G,B)
(m,m,B,G)∀m ∈ {B,G}
¾
Definition 3 The contract
¡
C0TTE
¢
is defined by the following system of equa-
tions:©
(ijkl) = 
∗,∀ (i, j, k, l) ∈ S2ª
This contract is the TTE derived in proposition 8. It defines allocation
rules that are independent of the coworkers’ revealed signals and leads to the
ETO for  ≥ 2qGqB+qG
³

 ≥ 2qGqB+qG
´
. The following contracts are defined in
the case a team has been formed at time 0, similar contracts can be defined
if a team has not been formed at time 0 by substituting  by 1 in systems¡
C1TTE
¢
and
³
C1
0
TTE
´
.
Definition 4 The contract
¡
C1TTE
¢
is defined by the following conditions:
GBGB ∈
h
1
 − qB(qB+qG) , 1−
qB
(qB+qG)
i
, GBGG = GBGB
(GBBB, GBBG, BBBG) ∈ A3, A ≡
h
0, 12
h
BGBG ∈
h
qB
(qB+qG)
, 1 + qB(qB+qG) − 1
i
, GGBG = BGBG
(GGGG, BBBB) ∈ B2, B ≡
h
1
2 , 1− 12
i
∀ (i, j, k, l) /∈ S0, ijkl = 0

The contract
¡
C1TTE
¢
is such that allocations depend on signals revealed by
coworkers at time 1. In particular, considering  < 2qˆGqB+qˆG , for (XI,1,1,XI,2,1) =
(G,B) [(B,G)] the share of the group outcome given to the first worker is
higher [lower] than equal splitting since 1− qB(qB+qG) >
1
2
h
−1
 +
qB
(qB+qG)
< 12
i
.
The contingent contract associated to full revelation of information in equi-
librium allows workers to be rewarded based on their true relative ability.
However, this contingent contract does not permit teams to be formed when
both workers receive a bad signal and at least one of them suffers from self-
serving biases. This is the case since truthful revelation is not a possible
equilibrium when  < qB+3qG2(qB+qG)
³

 <
qB+3qG
2(qB+qG)
´
if teams are formed both for
(1, 2) ∈ Σ and (XI,1,1,XI,2,1) ∈ V , where:
Σ1 ≡ {{(G,B) , (B,G)} ; {(G,B) , (B,B)} ; {(B,B) , (B,G)}} and V ≡
{(G,B) ; (B,G)}. To ensure that teams are not formed when (1, 2) ∈ Σ
in order to make team formation possible for (XI,1,1,XI,2,1) ∈ V , the allo-
cations GBBG, GBBB and BBBG are taken to be sufficiently low, that is
inferior to 12 .
Definition 5 The contract
³
C1
0
TTE
´
is defined by the following system:
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
GBGB ∈
h
1
 − qB(qB+qG) , 1−
1
2
i
⇒  ≥ qB+3qG2(qB+qG)
BGBG ∈
h
1
2 , 1− qG(qB+qG)
i
⇒  ≥ qB+3qG2(qB+qG)
GGBG = BBBG = BGBG, GBGG = GBBB = GBGB
(GGGG, BBBB) ∈ B2, B ≡
h
1
2 , 1− 12
i
GBBG ∈
h
0, 12
h
, ∀ (i, j, k, l) /∈ S0, ijkl = 0

The contract
³
C1
0
TTE
´
depends as well on signals revealed by cowork-
ers at time 1. The contract
³
C1
0
TTE
´
is defined only for  ≥ qB+3qG2(qB+qG)
whereas
¡
C1TTE
¢
is defined for any positive level of synergies. The reason
is that for  ≥ qB+3qG2(qB+qG) , the contract
¡
C1TTE
¢
can be improved by taking
BBBG = BGBG and GBBB = GBGB since then teams can be formed
at the same time for (1, 2) ∈ {{(G,B) , (B,B)} ; {(B,B) , (B,G)}} and
(XI,1,1,XI,2,1) ∈ {(G,B) ; (B,G)}. The contract
³
C1
0
TTE
´
does not permit
however the implementation of the efficient team outcome since teams are
not formed when both workers receive a bad signal and both workers exhibit
self-serving learning.
The three contracts proposed do not strictly dominate each other, choosing
among them will depend on the level of synergies as well as on learning biases.
This is captured in the next proposition.
Proposition 10 The contracts leading to the highest coworkers’ expected
payoffs for  < 2qˆGqB+qˆG satisfy the following conditions:
For  < qB+3qG2(qB+qG)
³
 ≥ qB+3qG2(qB+qG)
´
and pG <
(2p−p2)pB
2
³
pG >
p2pB
2
´
,
(C0TTE) is the best contract.
For  < qB+3qG2(qB+qG) and pG >
pB(2p−p2)
2 , (C
1
TTE) is the best contract.
For  ≥ qB+3qG2(qB+qG) and pG >
pB(p2)
2 , (C
1
0
TTE) is the best contract.
We know from proposition 8 that the contract
¡
C0TTE
¢
leads to individual
work when the signals received are asymmetric whereas from the definition
of the other two contracts team formation is obtained in that case. The three
contracts are not equivalent, contracts (C1TTE) and (C
1
0
TTE) being preferred
when self-serving biases are not too high respectively when p (2− p) < 2pGpB
and p <
q
2pG
pB
. An increase in coworkers’ learning biases (p) does not affect
the probability (pGG + pBB) with which a team is formed under contract¡
C0TTE
¢
whereas teams are formed less frequently when p rises for contracts
(C1TTE) and (C
1
0
TTE).
In the next corollary, we derive from propositions 9 and 10 the condi-
tions under which contracts stating fixed allocation rules are dominated by
contracts based on allocation rules contingent on coworkers’ revealed signals.
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Corollary 5 For  < 2qˆGqB+qˆG , contingent allocation rules are strictly pre-
ferred to fixed allocation rules when:  < qB+3qG2(qB+qG) and p (2− p) <
2pG
pB
and
when:  ≥ qB+3qG2(qB+qG) and p <
q
2pG
pB
.
For  ≥ 2qˆGqB+qˆG contingent allocation rules are strictly dominated by fixed
allocation rules.
Corollary 5 motivates the use of contingent allocation rules as long as
synergies and biases are not too high. It helps as well to understand why
fixed allocation rules are commonly observed. We show that it may be due
to the impossibility for agents to identify their learning errors from their
coworker. Our corollary implies that partnerships based on fixed allocation
rules can be justified when synergies are sufficiently high or when self-serving
biases are prevalent.37
7 Team managers
7.1 Introduction: the case of unsophisticated workers
To introduce the issue of team managers we consider the case of unsophisti-
cated agents. In section 5.2, we establish in corollary 3 that the presence of a
third agent (e.g: a manager) in the team is not a definitive solution to achieve
efficient cooperation. This result stresses the impossibility for a manager to
force teamwork when renegotiation is possible. The possibility to impose
teamwork has been evoked in the context of workers forming part of an or-
ganization.38 However, if renegotiation is possible, agents in the organization
willing to work alone, will be able to do so by offering side payments to their
managers. In addition, an agent working in a firm has still the opportunity
to leave the organization and work alone so that forcing teamwork should be
ineffective.
7.2 A model for team managers
We consider a situation in which a third agent called a manager has the possi-
bility to observe the outcomes of the team projects. The manager is assumed
to update workers’ abilities without biases. This assumption is in agree-
ment with the motivational explanation underlying biased self-attribution.
The manager is paid a proportion (& > 0) of the total payoffs of coworkers’
projects. The timing of the game is described as follows. At time 0, workers
decide simultaneously whether to be involved in an individual or team project
rewarded according to equal splitting. They decide as well if a manager should
be hired, if it is the case and the manager accepts the offer the game continues
as described below. If it is not the case, the game becomes the one presented
in sections 3.1 or 6.1. At time 1, workers receive the payoffs of the first period
37Such conditions may be satisfied for consulting partnerships if we take into account that
experts tend to be more self-confident than non experts (Griffin and Tversky 1992).
38Eaton and Hollis (2003) consider that teamwork can be imposed in an organization if
individual work is not rewarded at all.
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project and the manager decides the allocation rule for the team project in
the second period. This is equivalent to say that the manager has the full
bargaining power. At time 1
0
, workers decide whether to continue with the
first period project or undertake another project. It is straightforward to see
that if no bribery is possible, a ETE can be obtained in our framework. In
the absence of bribery, the BPE is truthful telling: the manager pays the
coworkers based on their true relative ability (that is the relative ability as
perceived by the manager). We have to ensure however that a manager has
an interest to participate, that is & > &¯, and that the presence of the manager
will be accepted by both workers.39 We provide in the next proposition a
rationale for the existence of managers. Managers prevent team conflicts by
designing contracts based on informed and objective beliefs about workers’
abilities. Managers are then paid an informational rent that is the result of
their unbiased assessments.
As long as & can be taken sufficiently close to 0 the presence of a manager
will be optimal for any of the situations in which the ETE is not achievable.
That is, as stated in proposition 11, if &¯ = 0 a manager is hired whenever
 < 2qˆGqB+qˆG
³

 <
2qˆG
qB+qˆG
´
. We state as well in the next proposition that,
when bribery is possible, the rent of the manager is lower and the manager is
hired less often by team members.
Proposition 11 For  < 2qˆGqB+qˆG
³

 <
2qˆG
qB+qˆG
´
, in the absence of opportu-
nities for bribery, a manager is hired with a strictly positive maximum rent
increasing in the level of synergies () and in the level of coworkers’ biases
(p).
If a manager is hired when bribery is possible it will be hired as well if no
bribery is possible.
For  < 2qˆGqB+qˆG
³

 <
2qˆG
qB+qˆG
´
, the best contracts are respectively: the
rigid allocation rule in the absence of a revelation game and the contracts¡
C1TTE
¢
and
³
C1
0
TTE
´
when the revelation game is available. In the absence of a
communication game, the manager will be hired as long as: & ≤ 1−' (, , p),
where ' (, , p) = pBB
qB
q∗
h
(1− p)2 + 1−(1−p)2
i
+ (pGG + pGB)
qG
q∗ and
∂(,,p)
∂ < 0,
∂(,,p)
∂p < 0. We call [1− ' (, , p)]  the maximum rent
of the manager. If contracts
¡
C1TTE
¢
and
³
C1
0
TTE
´
are available, the maximum
rent for the manager are respectively:£
1− '1 (, , p)¤ 2q∗ and h1− '10 (, , p)i 2q∗ where:
'1 (, , p) = pBBqBq∗
h
(1− p)2 + 1−(1−p)2
i
+ (pGG + pGB)
qG
q∗
'1
0
(, , p) = pBBqBq∗
h¡
1− p2¢+ pBB p2 + pBGi+ (pGG + pGB) qGq∗ .
It is straightforward to see that these maximum rents are increasing in
both  and p.
39We denote ¯ the revenue associated to the manager’s outside option.
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For  ≥ 2qˆGqB+qˆG
³

 ≥ 2qˆGqB+qˆG
´
, as long as there exists a contract that im-
plements the ETO (proposition 9), a manager is not hired since his maximum
rent is zero.
The proposition stresses how the objectivity of managers can be rewarded
in equilibrium. For the manager to be hired, the level of team synergies can-
not be too high
h
 < 2qˆGqB+qˆG
³

 <
2qˆG
qB+qˆG
´i
, however his salary is increasing
in  for  ∈
h
1, 2qˆGqB+qˆG
h³

 ∈
h
1, 2qˆGqB+qˆG
h´
. The rent of managers is increas-
ing in the synergy parameter since their presence allows more teams to be
formed. The more team formation is valued, the more team managers should
earn in equilibrium. Another reasonable result is that managers’ pay increases
as coworkers’ cognitive biases increase. This is the case because managers’
earnings depend on their informational advantage compared to team mem-
bers. If workers misperceive their ability more often, the team manager will
more often have superior information compared to coworkers. As a result, the
manager’s informational rent and then his pay are increasing in p. In our
model, there exists an incentive for team managers to maintain workers’ bi-
ased self-attribution at a high level in order to maximize their informational
rent. This behavior of managers is a limitation to the process of debiasing
coworkers that adds to the individual’s psychological cost.
In a context in which bribery is possible, the conditions for the implemen-
tation of the ETO are more difficult to meet. We state in the proposition that
managers are hired less frequently in that case. The argument is that, in the
presence of bribery, managers are paid more in equilibrium than in the case
of no bribery. If it was not the case, managers could reject the bribery offer.
Bribery increases the cost of hiring a manager whereas the benefits of his
presence are at most the same.40 The gains of engaging a manager are maxi-
mum when the ETO can be implemented in his presence, this happens when
no bribery is possible but may not happen with opportunities for bribery. As
a result, if  or p are not sufficiently high, managers may not be hired in
the bribery model for  < 2qˆGqB+qˆG
³

 <
2qˆG
qB+qˆG
´
. Bribery is detrimental to
everybody exante and should be restricted as much as possible.
8 Applications
In this section, we consider first an analysis of cooperation in the academic
profession. In a second part, we study the more general case of organizations.
We provide an economic justification for corporate culture and investments
in social capital.
40Further results are available upon request. We consider the modified framework in which
at time 1
0
, the two workers have the possibility to play a bribery game (B). The game (B) is
such that the two coworkers simultaneously offer an amount of money ai ∈ <+, ∀i ∈ {1, 2}
to their manager. The manager can accept (a3 = Y ) this offer or not (a3 = N). If the
manager accepts the offer of worker i, the bargaining power is entirely transferred to worker
i so that he is able to decide the allocation rule for the team project in the second period.
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8.1 Coauthorship
8.1.1 The issue: insufficient cooperation among researchers
There exists evidence that research institutions and academic departments
are concerned with insufficient coauthorship. To solve this issue institutions
tend to "over-reward" joint works. McDowell and Smith (1992) reject the
hypothesis according to which the weighting of coauthored articles in the
promotion of academics is equal to the inverse of the number of coauthors.
The authors use answers to a questionnaire given to 378 Economics researchers
in 20 of the most important US institutions from 1968 to 1975. They find
that each author of a n−authors article is rewarded more than 1n of the credits
given to a single authored article of the same quality. Schinski, Kugler and
Wick (1998) using a survey of 140 Finance academics in 1995 confirm the
result of McDowell and Smith (1992). Similar results have been obtained by
Liebowitz and Palmer (1983) and in other fields than Economics by Long and
McGinnis (1982). The rules used by research institutions can be interpreted
as a mechanism to provide incentives for researchers to write joint papers.
8.1.2 An explanation based on biased self-attribution
As a direct application of our model, we consider the decision of two re-
searchers to write a joint paper. As we have shown in proposition 1, when
self-serving biases are present, researchers may not want to write a joint pa-
per even when it would be optimal to do so under a rational perspective. By
anticipating the possibility that you yourself or your coauthor will attribute
success to his own talent rather than other’s talent, you may decide to write
a paper alone even in the presence of strictly positive synergies. As long as
researchers suffer from learning biases and take these biases into account, less
joint papers will be written than in the absence of such biases. If researchers
exhibit self-serving learning but do not realize theirs and others’ biases, more
joint projects will be started but a larger proportion than in the rational case
will end after the first article has been written.
8.1.3 A solution: find the optimal coauthor
In order to limit the negative effects of motivated learning, researchers may
consider to select their coauthors according to their degree of self-serving bi-
ases. A possibility is to use gender, nationality or self-confidence as selection
criteria to improve the choice of one’s coauthor. There is empirical evidence
of significant cultural and gender differences in the magnitude of self-serving
biases. Japanese have been found to be particularly responsive to negative
signals about their ability whereas North Americans tended to discount such
evidence (Kitayama et al. 1997, Heine, Kitayama, Lehman, 2001). Beyer
(1990) found that self-serving evaluation biases are more representative of
men than women. Another possibility for researchers is to select coauthors
with low self-esteem. Psychologists have found that agents with low levels of
self-confidence are equally likely to recall positive and negative self-relevant
information (Kuiper and Derry 1982). Finally, establishing friendship among
31
coauthors can reduce the negative effects of self-serving biases on cooperation.
As long as workers learn as positively about others as they learn about them-
selves self-serving biases will not undermine team formation. Brown (1986)
found that friends and relatives are evaluated less negatively than an average
person since they receive more credit for success and less blame for failure.
However, the negative impact of self-serving biases on group formation will
not disappear as long as learning biases are stronger in evaluating one’s ability
than one’s coworker’s abilities.
8.2 Applications to the organization
8.2.1 Corporate culture and social capital
Following our model, we can regard corporate culture as a system of values
facilitating cooperation in the workplace. This is the case since corporate
culture by inducing workers to share common and exclusive (only the members
of the firm) values functions as a mechanism to develop fellowship in the
workplace. As found in Brown (1986) people tend to learn more positively
about friends than about other agents so that fellowship among coworkers
can reduce the negative effects of self-serving attribution on team formation.
Assuming workers learn identically about themselves and about others, the
ETE is obtained, that is teams are formed whenever there exists positive
synergies. This occurs since workers discounting negative evidence about their
ability will discount as well negative evidence about their coworker’s ability.
In that case, the conditions for team formation at time 1 are identical to the
maximum cooperation case consisting in forming a team for  ≥ 1 ( ≥ ) if
a team has (not) been formed at time 0. According to our model, a corporate
culture will be developed as long as the costs for establishing common values
among workers are compensated by an increase in firm’s profits due to an
increase in workers’ cooperation.
Formally, we modify the model described in section 2 by assuming the
existence of a manager that is rewarded a proportion ()) of the outcomes
obtained by the two workers in the individual and team projects.41 In the first
period of our model, we assume there exists an opportunity for the manager of
our team to establish a corporate culture at a cost c ≥ 0.42 We consider that
the strength of cultural rules (proportional to c) reduces the probability (π in
section 3) with which at least one worker learns more positively about himself
than about his coworker, this probability is denoted π(c) where π
0
(c) < 0. We
assume π(c) = π0 − *c where * > 0 measures the impact of cultural rules on
workers’ assessment of others’ abilities.
We consider the following situation:  < ∗,π(c) and 1 < ∗∗,π(c) <  <
41The existence of a manager is justified as long as his investment in corporate culture
makes both workers better-off.
42A corporate culture is unlikely to be initiated by managers but they have a role in
promoting cultural rules. As stated by Camerer and Vepsalainen (1988): "Cultural rules
spring up randomly like weeds in a garden; the manager’s job is to pull the weeds and
cultivate the plants".
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∗∗,π0 such that a profitable team ( ≥ 1) will not be formed if no corporate
culture is created whereas it will be formed if cultural rules are established.43
Under the latter ranges of values for parameters, investing in corporate culture
may rise manager’s expected utility since the cost of establishing cultural
rules may be overweighted by the increase in workers’ cooperation. Under
the latter specification, a manager will invest in corporate culture if: c <
2) (1 + ) ( − 1) q∗ + (1− ) (pBG (qB + qG) + 2pBBqB) ≡ c¯ for  < B
and if: c < c¯ − 2 (1− ) pBBqB for B ≤  < ∗.44,45 As long as the
cost of building social capital is not too high, the manager will be better-off
investing in corporate values. More positive synergies will favour investment
in corporate culture since then gains for increased cooperation are larger. For
a given cost c, the range of synergy values  for which social capital is valuable
to the manager increases in coworkers’ responsiveness to corporate values (*).
Our model provides a motive for investing in corporate culture since it
improves workers’ cooperation. Corporate culture is seen as an opportunity
to develop social capital in the organization. Social capital is defined by
Cohen and Prusak (2001) as:
"the stock of active connections among people: the trust, mu-
tual understanding, and shared values and behaviors that bind
the members of human networks and communities and make co-
operative action possible."
Cohen and Prusak provide a large number of examples of investment in
social capital that improved cooperation in the organization.46 Our framework
provides a theoretical support for such investments by establishing how a
high stock of social capital can lead to economic gains through an increased
cooperation among workers.
Our framework can be used to justify the existence of consulting firms spe-
cialized in promoting teamwork in the organization as for example Laxa, the
P lexus corporation, the Teambuildinginc or the Thinkshop.47 Firms ap-
pear to be concerned about facilitating teamwork and are ready to invest in
expensive programs that propose to develop team spirit by organizing group
activities such as fly-fishing, sailing or rockclimbing. All these activities have
in common that they participate in developing fellowship among coworkers
so as to promote teamwork in the organization. Consistent with our model,
Japanese organizations are characterized by strong personal links among em-
ployees and the extensive use of teamwork (Haitani 1990, Koike 1988).
43∗∗,π(c) =
(1+)(2++2)+(2+1)−π(c)2
(1+)(2++2)+(2+1)−π(c)2 and
∂∗∗,π(c)
∂π(c) > 0.
44Recall that: B =
2q∗
(qB+q∗) and ∗ =
2qG
(qB+qG)
.
45 It is easy to see that the two thresholds for (c) are strictly positive.
46As an example, the authors evoke the investments of the firm Alcoa that consisted in
building headquarters providing more space for employees to meet and talk (p82).
47This is only a small subsample of consulting firms dedicated to boost teamwork in the
organization.
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8.2.2 Organizational structure and cultural differences
Cultural differences in the way people learn about themselves have been doc-
umented. Japanese tend to be more self-critical than individuals from West-
ern countries (Kitayama et al. 1997, Heine et al. 1999, Heine, Kitayama,
and Lehman 2001). In agreement with our model is the observation that
the Japanese society in which self-criticism is seen more positively than self-
confidence is characterized by a corporate culture based on teamwork and
cooperation (Abegglen 1958, Haitani 1990, Koike 1988).48 Florida and Ken-
ney (1991) analyzing the transfer of Japanese organizations to the US report
that a firm like Toyota has been working with local school systems in order to
develop group-oriented behavior of his future employees. The authors docu-
ment that Japanese firms select their US employees taking into account their
ability to work in teams. However, an excessive degree of self-criticism may
imply an inefficient use of teamwork in Japanese organizations, that is teams
are formed for  < 1.
9 Conclusion
The objective of our paper is to analyze the conditions for team formation
when learning about workers’ ability is introduced. In particular, we focus
on learning when agents suffer from self-serving biases. We find that when
the group outcome is shared equally among workers, learning with or without
biases undermines workers’ cooperation. This is the case because as workers
receive asymmetric news about their abilities they have an incentive to split
the team and work alone. A lower level of cooperation among workers leads
to a reduction in agents’ expected welfare. As a consequence, making learning
less accessible has a positive impact on workers’ expected utility.
Interestingly, when a more flexible sharing rule depending on workers’ rel-
ative abilities is introduced, learning has a negative impact on team formation
only in the presence of self-serving biases. The idea is that in the presence of
learning biases agents may hold different beliefs about abilities preventing
any flexible sharing rule to ensure a sufficiently high level of workers’ cooper-
ation. For some positive levels of synergies it may be impossible to design an
allocation rule such that both workers see themselves better-off working as a
team.
We are able to provide recommendations to foster workers’ cooperation
when agents suffer from self-serving biases as for example designing adequate
team contracts, introducing a team manager or favoring projects for which
learning is not accessible.
We apply our model to the academic profession. We predict that too little
cooperation among researchers may occur as a result of self-serving biases. A
possible solution is to select one’s coauthor according to his age, gender or
nationality in order to minimize one’s coworker’s learning biases. Our model
48A formal analysis of team formation with self-critical workers is developed in Corgnet
(2005b).
34
is finally used to analyze the relevance of corporate culture as a mechanism
to improve workers’ cooperation.
Our work by establishing the negative impact of learning biases on coop-
eration in the workplace challenges the view of researchers emphasizing the
positive role of biased self-perception.49 In the words of Taylor and Brown
(1988):
"(...) the capacity to develop and maintain positive illusions may
be thought of as valuable human resource to be nurtured and pro-
moted, rather than an error-prone processing system to be cor-
rected. In any case, these illusions help make each individual’s
world a warmer and more active and beneficent place in which to
live".
Our model can be extended to more complex teams. A possible direction
of research is to analyze the impact of learning biases on the formation of
networks and on the optimal organizational structure of firms.
49Many authors have focused on how biased self-perception can increase motivation and
lead agents to work harder. At a theoretical level we can refer to the works of Bénabou
and Tirole (2002) and Gervais and Goldstein (2004). At the empirical level, Felson (1984)
found that a positive view of oneself was associated to working harder and longer on tasks.
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10 Appendix
Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1. We denote UT (UI,i) the total payoffs of worker i
associated to the decision of forming a team at time 0. We drop subscript i since
workers’ utility functions are identical.
Conditions for team formation at time 1:
Using simple algebra, one can derive the following conditions for team formation
at time 1.
Assuming a team has been formed at time 0, the conditions for team formation
at time 1 are as follows:
For  ≤ 1 ≡ 1 , workers will decide to work alone whatever the history of signals.
For 1 ≤  < ∗ ≡ 2qG(qB+qG) = 2(1+ +1) , workers will form a team at time 1 if
the signals received are either both failures or both successes. For  ≥ ∗, agents
will work as a team at time 1 whatever the history of signals. Assuming workers did
not form a team at time 0, the conditions for team formation at time 1 are the same
multiplying the thresholds 1 and ∗ by 
2.
Conditions for team formation at time 0:
Assume first:  ≤ ∗:
For  < 1 whatever the history of signals at time 1 no teams are formed at time
0. For 1 ≤  <  teams are formed at 0 if the expected utility of forming a group
at 0 is higher for worker i ∈ {1, 2} than working alone, that is for i = 1 (the case
i = 2 is symmetric):
E
h
UT | I0, 1≤  <  < ∗
i
≥ E
h
UI | I0, 1≤  <  < ∗
i
⇔
P
£
XI,1,1= G;XI,2,1= G
¤ ³
G+2 E
h
XI,1,2+XI,2,2| XI,1,1= G;XI,2,1= G
i´
+P
£
XI,1,1= B;XI,2,1= B
¤ ³
B+2 E
h
XI,1,2+XI,2,2| XI,1,1= B;XI,2,1= B
i´
+P
£
XI,1,1= G;XI,2,1= B
¤ ³
2G+E
h
XI,1,2| XI,1,1= G
i´
+P
£
XI,1,1= B;XI,2,1= G
¤ ³
2B +E
h
XI,1,2| XI,1,1= B
i´
≥ (1 + ) +
⇔  ≥ (1+)(
2++2+2+)+(2+1)
(1+)(2++2+2+)+(2+1)
≡ ∗∗, where 1 < ∗∗≤ .
Assume now:  > ∗:
For  < 1 whatever the history of signals at time 1 no teams are formed at time
0. For 1 ≤  < ∗, the condition for team formation is:  ≥ ∗∗. For ∗ ≤  < ,
the condition for team formation is:  ≥ 1. For  ≥ , teams are always formed.
We can prove that thresholds for team formation at time 0 are always lower
than . We define W ≡ (+ ) (+  + 1), it is easy to see that the expected
utility for forming a team at time 0 is higher than the expected utility of staying
alone as long as: W + zw+yw≥W + Zw+Y w⇔  ≥W+Zw−ywW+zw−Yw where:
zw+yw= Zw+Y w= +  =W and
W+Zw−yw
W+zw−Yw≤ .
As a result, the condition for team formation when  ≥ ∗ is:
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 ≥ Max {1;Min {∗; ∗∗}}. The first proposition follows directly from the
previous thresholds.
Proof of Proposition 2. Conditions for team formation at time 1:
Using simple algebra, one can derive the following conditions:
Under assumption 2a− 2b (2c), assuming a team has been formed at time 0, if
at least one worker ignores his bad signal (and does not realize it, it occurs with prob-
ability (1− )), the condition for team formation at time 1 are modified compared
to the rational model as follows:
For  < 1 , workers will decide to work alone whatever the history of signals.
For 1 ≤  < B ≡ 2q
∗
(qB+q∗)
, workers will form a team at time 1 only if the signals
received are both successes. For B ≤  < ∗ ≡ 2qG(qB+qG) , workers will form a
team at time 1 if the signals received are either both failures or both successes. For
 ≥ ∗, agents will form a team at time 1 whatever the history of signals. Assuming
workers did not form a team at time 0, the conditions for team formation at time 1
are the same as when workers did form a team at time 0 except that thresholds are
multiplied by 2.
Conditions for team formation at time 0:
We use the following notations: pGG ≡ P [XI,1,1= G;XI,2,1 = G] , pGB ≡
P [XI,1,1= G;XI,2,1 = B] , pBG ≡ P [XI,1,1= B;XI,2,1 = G]
and pBB ≡ P [XI,1,1= B;XI,2,1 = B].
We consider first the case: 1≤  ≤ B≤ 2B< ∗, it implies:
 <
q
1+ 
22+3+2++1
. For  < 1 , agents will decide to work alone at time
0. For 1 ≤  < , the expected payoff of forming a team is higher than working
alone if:
E1,S
h
UT | I0, 1≤  <  < ∗
i
≥ E1,S
h
UI,1| I0, 1≤  <  < ∗
i
⇔ (1− π)E
h
UG| I0, 1≤  <  ≤ ∗
i
+π

PGG
³
G+2 E1,S
h
XI,1,2+XI,2,2| XI,1,1= G;XI,2,1= G
i´
+PBB
³
B +E1,S
h
XI,1,2| XI,1,1= B
i´
+PGB
³

2G+E1,S
h
XI,1,2| XI,1,1= G
i´
+PBG
³

2G+E1,S
h
XI,1,2| XI,1,1= B
i´
]

≥ (1 + ) +
⇔  ≥ (1+)(
2++2)+(2+1)−π2
(1+)(2++2)+(2+1)−π2 ≡ ∗∗,π , where
∂∗∗,π
∂π > 0 and 1 <
∗∗,π ≤ .
The condition for team formation is then:  ≥ ∗∗,π. For  ≥ , teams are
always formed.
The second case is: 1≤  < B≤ ∗≤ 2B, it implies that:q
1+ 
22+3+2++1
≤  <
q
1+ 12+2+1
For  < 1 , agents will decide to work alone at time 0. For
1
 ≤  < , the
expected payoff of forming a team is higher than working alone if:  ≥ ∗∗,π. As a
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result, the condition for team formation at time 0 is the same as in case 1.
In case 3, we consider: 1≤ B≤ ∗≤  ≤ 2B. The latter condition implies:
 ≥
q
1 + 12+1 . For  <
1
 , agents will decide not to form a team. For
1
 ≤  <
B, the threshold is computed as in cases 1 and 2 so that team formation occurs
at time 0 for  ≥ ∗∗,π. For B ≤  < ∗, the condition for team formation is:
 ≥ ∗∗. For ∗ ≤  < , the condition for team formation is:  ≥ 1. For  ≥ ,
teams are always formed. As a result, the condition for team formation is such that:½
 ≥ ∗∗,π for ∗∗,π< B
 ≥Max {B; 1;Min {∗; ∗∗}} for ∗∗,π≥ B
¾
In case 4, we have: 1 ≤ B ≤  < ∗ ≤ 2B. Case 4 corresponds to:q
1 + 12+2+1 ≤  <
q
1 + 12+1 . For  <
1
 individuals will decide to
work alone. For 1 ≤  < B, the condition for team formation is  ≥ ∗∗,π. For
B ≤  < , the condition for team formation is  ≥ ∗∗. As a result, the condition
for the formation of a team at time 0 is:½
 ≥ ∗∗,π for ∗∗,π< B
 ≥Max {B; ∗∗} for ∗∗,π≥ B
¾
For  ≥ , teams are always formed. The first and second parts of the propo-
sition are a direct consequence of the previous derivation of the thresholds for team
formation at time 0. The crucial element is:
∂∗∗,π
∂π > 0.
The proof holds for assumption 2b when π is taken to be p and for assumption
2c when π ≡ Π.
Proof of Corollary 1. It follows from proposition 2; ∀p > 0 less efficient teams
(characterized by  ≥ 1) will be formed than in the case p = 0. In addition, the
teams that are formed will be split with higher probability in the case p > 0, this
implies that the expected utility of the teams formed when p > 0 will be lower than
in the case p = 0. As a consequence, the expected welfare of coworkers is always
higher in the absence of self-serving attribution than in the case p > 0.
Proof of Proposition 3. Conditions for team formation at time 1 after a team
has been formed at time 0 (resp. has not been formed):
Case\Signals (G,G) (B,B) (B,G); (G,B)
Observability ()
At least 1 worker is biased
 ≥ 1
(≥ 1)
 ≥ 2q∗q∗+qB≡ Γ∗
(≥ 2q
∗
q∗+qB )
 ≥ 2qGqG+qB≡ ∗
(≥ 2qGqG+qB )
Non Observability (1− )
At least 1 worker is biased
 ≥ 1
(≥ 1)
 ≥ 1
(≥ 1)
 ≥ 1
(≥ 1)
Observability ()
No biases
 ≥ 1
(≥ 1)
 ≥ 1
(≥ 1)
 ≥ 2qGqG+qB
(≥ 2qGqG+qB )
Non Observability (1− )
No biases
 ≥ 1
(≥ 1)
 ≥ 1
(≥ 1)
 ≥ 1
(≥ 1)
At time 0, case 1: 1 ≤ Γ∗ ≤ ∗ ≤  ≤ 2Γ∗ ≤ 2∗.
For  < 1 : no teams are formed. For
1
 ≤  < Γ∗, teams are formed for
 ≥  ≡ (1+)(+)(++1)−(2+1)(1+)(+)(++1)−(2+1) where 1 <  ≤  and ∂∂ > 0. For
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Γ∗ ≤  < ∗, teams are formed for:
 ≥ ,π≡ (1+)(+)(++1)−[(2+1)+π](1+(1−))(+)(++1)+[(+1)+(1−π)2]<  where
∂,π
∂ > 0.
For ∗ ≤  < , teams are formed for  ≥ 1. For  ≥ , teams are always formed.
Case 2: 1 ≤ Γ∗ ≤  < ∗ ≤ 2Γ∗ ≤ 2∗ or
1
 ≤ Γ∗ ≤  ≤ 2Γ∗ < ∗ ≤ 2∗
For  < 1 : no teams are formed. For
1
 ≤  < Γ∗, teams are formed for
 ≥ ,π . For ΓB <  < , teams are formed for  > , where  < . For
 ≥ , teams are always formed.
Case 3: 1 ≤  < Γ∗ ≤ ∗ ≤ 2Γ∗ ≤ 2∗ or
1
 ≤  < Γ∗ ≤ 2Γ∗ < ∗ ≤ 2∗
For  < 1 : no teams are formed. For
1
 ≤  < , teams are formed for
 ≥ ,π. For  ≥ , teams are always formed. An increase in signals’ availability
( rises) changes workers’ decisions in the following cases where H > L:
a) A team is formed at time 0 in the low signals availability case but not formed
in the high signals availability case, this can occur in case 1, 2 and 3 since ,π and
 are increasing in . The coworkers’ expected payoffs is higher in the low signals
availability since a profitable team ( ≥ 1) is formed in that case whereas it is not
formed in the case of high signals availability.
b) Workers form a team at time 0 in both the high and low signals availability
cases, but a team is formed at time 1 if no signals are available whereas a team may
not be formed if signals are available in the case of asymmetric signals or in the case
of two bad signals when learning biases do arise. In that case, coworkers’ expected
welfare is higher when signals availability is low.
It follows from a) and b) that expected coworkers’ welfare is higher for a lower
signals availability  under assumption 2c. Under assumption 2a, proposition 3
follows directly from b). The situation is more complex under assumption 2b since
workers are underestimating the probability of a team break at time 1. As a result,
an increase in  will lead to more restrictive conditions for team formation at time
0 (,p < ,Π) so that as long as  does not rise too much (the thresholds for
team formation specified above are increasing in ). For p = 0 or  = 0, ,p =
,Π so that a rise in  can only have a positive impact on coworkers’ expected
welfare. Coworkers’ expected welfare rises for any H such that L,Π > H ,p.
For H ,p ≥ L,Π, the coworkers expected payoffs are higher in the case of low
signals availability L.
Proof of Proposition 4. Conditions for team formation at time 1 after a team
has been formed at time 0 (resp. after a team has not been formed at time 0):
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Signals\Case No signal 1
Signal 2
No signal 1
Signal 2
No signal 1
No Signal 2
Signal 1
Signal 2
(G,G)
 ≥ ∆G
( ≥ ∆G)
 ≥ ∆G
(≥ ∆G)
 ≥ 1
(≥ 1)
 ≥ 1
(≥ 1)
(B,B)
 ≥ Γ∗
(≥ Γ∗)
 ≥ Γ∗
( ≥ Γ∗)
 ≥ 1
(≥ 1)
 ≥ 1
(≥ 1)
(B,G)
 ≥ ∆G
( ≥ ∆G)
 ≥ Γ∗
( ≥ Γ∗)
 ≥ 1
(≥ 1)
 ≥ ∗
( ≥ 2∗)
(G,B)
 ≥ Γ∗
(≥ Γ∗)
 ≥ ∆G
(≥ ∆G)
 ≥ 1
(≥ 1)
 ≥ ∗
( ≥ 2∗)
Where ∆G ≡ 2qGq∗+qG , Γ∗ ≡
2q∗
q∗+qB and ∗ ≡
2qG
(qB+qG)
.
Assuming first: ∆G ≥ Γ∗.
At time 0, Case 1: 1 ≤  ≤ Γ∗ ≤ ∆G ≤ ∗ ≤ Γ∗ ≤ ∆G ≤ 2∗
For  < 1 , no teams are formed. For
1
 ≤  < , teams are formed for:
 ≥ (1+−((1−1)+(1−2)−2(1−1)(1−2)))(+)(++1)−(2+1)12)(1+−((1−1)+(1−2)−2(1−1)(1−2)))(+)(++1)−(2+1)12)≡ ∗,1,2
Where 1 < ∗,1,2 ≤  and ∗,1,2 = 1 if and only if 1 = 2 = 0. We
have:
∂∗,1,2
∂i
> 0 ∀i ∈ {1, 2}. For  ≥ , teams are always formed.
Case 2: 1 ≤ Γ∗ <  ≤ ∆G ≤ ∗ ≤ Γ∗ ≤ ∆G ≤ 2∗For  < 1 , no teams
are formed. For 1 ≤  < Γ∗ , teams are formed for:  ≤ ∗,1,2 . For Γ∗ ≤  < ,
teams are formed for:
 ≥Max {∗∗ (, ,1, 2) ; ∗∗ (,,2, 1)} ≡M1,2
Where ∗∗ (,, 1, 2) ≡
(1+)(+)(++1)−(1(1−2)+2(1−1))(++2)−12(2+1)−1(1−2)
(1+(1−1)(1−2))(+)(++1)+(1(1−2)+2(1−1))
³
(2+1)
2
+2
´
+12(+2+2)
We can show that 1 < M1,2 <  and M, = 1. For  ≥ , teams are
always formed.
Case 3: 1 ≤ Γ∗ ≤ ∆G <  ≤ ∗ ≤ Γ∗ ≤ ∆G ≤ 2∗
For  < 1 , no teams are formed. For
1
 ≤  < Γ∗ , teams are formed for:
 ≥ ∗,1,2 . For Γ∗ ≤  < ∆G , teams are formed for:  ≥ ∗∗,1,2 . For ∆G ≤
 < , teams are formed for:  ≥ (1+)(+)(++1)−12(2+1)(1+)(+)(++1)−12(2+1) ≡ ∗∗∗,1,2
where 1 < ∗∗∗,1,2 ≤  and ∗∗∗,1,2 = 1 if and only if 1 = 2 = 0. We have:
∂∗∗∗,1,2
∂i
> 0 ∀i ∈ {1, 2}. For  ≥ , teams are always formed.
Case 4: 1 ≤ Γ∗ ≤ ∆G ≤ ∗ <  ≤ Γ∗ ≤ ∆G ≤ 2∗
For  < 1 , no teams are formed. For
1
 ≤  < Γ∗ , teams are formed for:
 > ∗,1,2 . For
Γ∗
 ≤  < ∆G , teams are formed for:  > M1,2 . For
∆G
 ≤  < ∗, teams are formed for:  > ∗∗∗,1,2 . For ∗ ≤  < , teams are
formed for:  > 1. For  > , teams are always formed.
Proposition 4 follows directly from:
¡
∗,1,2 ,M1,2 , ∗∗∗,1,2
¢
= (1, 1, 1)⇔
1 = 2 = 0.
For ∆G < Γ∗ the demonstration is identical.
Proof of Proposition 5. Directly follows from the conditions for team formation
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at time 1. Teams are formed at time 1 after a team has been formed (has not been
formed) at time 0 if  ≥  ( 1 ). As a result, at time 0 teams are formed for  ≥ 1
(positive synergies).
Proof of Proposition 6. We show here that it is impossible to design allocation
rules at time 1 that will lead workers to form teams whenever  ≥ 1 [] after a team
has [not] been formed at time 0. We show that it is true even if we assume biases are
observable so that allocations can be made contingent on learning biases occurring
at time 1.
At time 1, if only one coworker suffers from self-serving biases and the history of
signals is (B,B), the allocation rule most favorable for workers’ cooperation is such
that team formation arises for:
 ≥ 2XB+12 > 1 since XB ≡ q
∗
q∗+qB >
1
2 (if a team has been formed at time
0) and (if no teams have been formed at time 0)  ≥ 2XB+12 ≡ Θb > 1.
If worker 1 (resp. 2) suffers from learning biases and the history of signals is
(B,G) (resp. (G,B)), the conditions most favorable for workers’ cooperation are
such that teams are formed for:
 ≥ q∗q∗+qG +
qG
qB+qG
(≡ Θgb) > 1 (if a team has been formed at time 0) and

 ≥ q
∗
q∗+qG +
qG
qB+qG
> 1 (if a team has not been formed at time 0).
If both workers suffer from learning biases and the history of signals is (B,B),
the conditions most favorable for workers’ cooperation are such that teams are formed
for:
 ≥ 2XB(≡ Θbb) > 1 (if a team has been formed at time 0) and  ≥ 2XB > 1
(if a team has not been formed at time 0). As a result, even choosing the allocation
rule that maximize workers’ cooperation the conditions for team formation at time 1
are more demanding than in the efficient teams equilibrium since: Θgb > 1, Θb > 1
and Θbb > 1.
Proposition 6’. We assume the ability of worker 1 (q1) is common knowl-
edge. We denote  the share of the group outcome obtained by worker 2. Af-
ter bad news have been received about worker 2’s ability and given that worker 2
suffers from biased recall the maximum level of cooperation is obtained for  =³

++1
+q1
´

+³

+
+q1
´
q1+
³

++1
+q1
´

+
. Given  (allocation rule that maximizes workers’ co-
operation), the conditions for team formation at time 0 are as follows:
 ≥ Γ()p > 1 for  < l
 ≥ Φ > 1 for l ≤  < Φ
 ≥ 1 for  ≥ Φ

Where Φ = q1
++1
+q1
+

+

+
+q1
> 1.
We have: Γ()p =
1+− p
++1
1+− p
++1
, so that 1 < Γ()p ≤ .
We denote l the level of learning by doing such that Γ
(l)
p =
Φ
l
.
As a result, the ETO is not attainable for the following values of parameters:
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(
1 ≤  < Γ()p and 1 ≤  < l
1 ≤  < Φ and l ≤  < Φ
)
Robustness of proposition 6 to any synergy function. We have assumed
until now that the team outcome was: f (a,XI,1,t,XI,2,t) = a (XI,1,t +XI,2,t) ,∀a ∈
<m form ≥ 1, but the impossibility result captured in proposition 9 is valid for any
function f as long as there exists positive synergies. We consider functions f such
that there exists strictly positive synergies (condition i) and f is continuous with
respect to XI,i,t (condition ii).
(i) f (a,XI,1,t,XI,2,t) > XI,1,t+XI,2,t and
∂f(a,XI,1,t,XI,2,t)
∂XI,i,t
> 1,∀i ∈ {1, 2}.
(ii)
∂f(a,XI,1,t,XI,2,t)
∂XI,i,t
is continuous ∀i ∈ {1, 2}.
In the presence of positive synergies and in the absence of biased self-attribution,
the ETO is attainable when the allocation rule is based on relative ability. In the
absence of positive synergies f (a,XI,1,t,XI,2,t) = XI,1,t+XI,2,t and in the presence
of self-serving learning, the ETO will not be achieved in the sense that there exists a
vector of parameter values a ∈ A ⊂ <m for the function f such that no teams will
be formed at time 0. If we assume that f is continuous with respect to synergies,
that is (ii) holds, we can conclude that even when synergies are strictly positive there
exists ∀f satisfying (i− ii) a range of parameter values of the synergy function such
that the ETO cannot be achieved.
Proof of Corollary 2. Similar to the proof of corollary 1.
Proof of Corollary 3. As a result of proposition 9, there exists no budget
balanced contracts that can implement the efficient team equilibrium. Given that in
our framework a contract is budget balanced if and only if it is renegotiation-proof
(this is a direct consequence of Lemma 1 in Bartling and von Siemens (2004) for
 = 0), for 1+ 2 = 1 there exists no renegotiation-proof contracts implementing
the ETO.
The second part of the corollary is proven below. We consider now the case
1+2 < 1. We introduce a third party able to observe without biases the outcome
of the two other workers. The third agent is rewarded 3 of the group outcome
(1 + 2 + 3 = 1). We consider the case in which a team has been formed at time
0, the same reasoning applies when a team has not been formed at time 0. Assume
that (XI,1,1,XI,2,1) = (B,B), 1 = (G,B) and 2 = (B,G), this occurs with
probability p2pBB . The third agent contract can be designed at time 0 in order to
penalize workers breaking the team. A proportion (1− x)
h³
1− x0
´i
of the payoffs
of the first and second workers is given to the third party if a team is maintained
(broken) in the second period, where
³
x, x
0
´
∈ [0, 1]2. However, the introduction
of a third party being able to penalize team breaks may not be renegotiation-proof.
A necessary condition to obtain the ETO is that forming a team is preferred
to working alone when (XI,1,1,XI,2,1) = (B,B), 1 = (G,B) and 2 = (B,G),
where h1 + h2 = 1 = x+ xh1 + xh2
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½
 (qB + qG)xh1 ≥ x0qG
 (qB + qG) (1− x− xh1) ≥ x0qG
¾
(Q)
A necessary condition to get an ETE is x
0
xh1
= x
0
1−x−xh1 ⇔ h1 = h2 = 12 .
Then, from the first inequality in (Q) we get that x
0
< x is a necessary condition
for an ETE. However, for this contract to be renegotiation- proof, we need that the
third party is better-off when a team is actually formed (if not there would be an
incentive to write a new contract a time 1), that is:  (1− x) 2qB≥
³
1− x0
´
2qB
⇔  ≥1−x
0
1−x > 1. If it is not the case, workers can propose an amount of money
for the third party to get a proportion of the individual outcome
³
1− x00
´
<³
1− x0
´
. We can conclude that there exists no long term commitment contracts
that can implement the ETO.
Proof of Proposition 7. Notice that for p = 0, it is clear that the optimal
choice for worker 2 is ¯ ≤ 12 . For p > 0, the unbiased agent (worker 2) select ¯ such
that worker 1 form a team. It is clear that with probability ppBB, worker 2 will
ensure a team is formed (after a team has been formed at time 0) if:
 (qB + qG)  ≥ qG ⇒ ¯ = qG(qB+qG) and worker 1 form a team for:
 (1− ¯) 2qB ≥ qB ⇔  ≥ qB+3qG2(qB+qG) . For  <
2qG
qB+qG
, the expected pay-
offs for the unbiased worker are higher for ¯ > 12 than for equal splitting if:
pγφ (pBB2 (1− η¯) qB + pGB (qB+qG) (1− η¯) + pGGqG2 (1− η¯))
+ (1− p) γφ (pBB2 (1− η¯) qB + pBG (qB+qG) (1− η¯) + pGGqG2 (1− η¯))≥
p (pBBqB+pGBqB+pGGqG)
+ (1− p) (pBBqB+pGBqB+pGGqG)
⇔ p >
³
2qG
qB+qG
−
´
(pBBqB+pGGqG)+(1−)(pGBqB+pGBqG)
(−1)pBBqB ≡ p¯> 0.
Proof of Proposition 8. First, we show an ETE is only possible in a truth-
ful telling equilibrium (TTE). Assume the payoff at time 0’ is (XI,1,1,XI,2,1) =
(B,B) and both agents suffer from self-serving learning (i.e: 1 = (G,B) and
2 = (B,G)). To have team formation for any  ≥ 1
³

 ≥ 1
´
we need that
workers’ beliefs converge through thanks to the revelation game. As long as agents’
beliefs do not converge, proposition 6 shows that an ETE is no attainable. The only
way beliefs can converge in the case mentioned above is when both workers recover
the true signal (B,B). That is, the only equilibrium compatible with the ETE is a
TTE.
Second, we prove that a TTE implementing the efficient team outcome is not
possible for  < 2qGqB+qG
³

 <
2qG
qB+qG
´
when a team has been formed at time 0.
A TTE is such that in equilibrium workers reveal their observed signals: ai = i
so that beliefs in equilibrium are such that P [(XI,1,1,XI,2,1) = (a12, a21)] = 1. A
TTE must satisfy the following conditions stating that workers cannot be worse-
off by playing ai 6= i whether a team has been formed or not at time 0,where
p0 = P (XI,i,1 = B | i = G) = ppBpG ,∀i ∈ {1, 2}.
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
∀ (i, j)∈ S,
[1] (BGBG)≥ (ijBG)
[10] (BGBG)≤ (GBij)
[2] (1− p) (BBBB)+p(BBBG)≥ (1− p) (ijBB)+p(ijBG)
[20] (1− p) (BBBB)+p(BBBG)≥ (1− p) (ijBB)+p(ijBG)
[3] p0 (1− p) (GBBB)2qB+p0p(GBBG)2qB+(1− p0) (1− p) (GBGB) (qB+qG)
+ (1− p) p(GBGG) (qB+qG)≥ p0 (1− p) (ijBB)2qB+p
0
p(ijBG)2qB
+(1− p0) (1− p) (ijGB) (qB+qG)+ (1− p0) p(ijGG) (qB+qG)
[30] p0(1− p) (BBij)2qB + p
0
p(GBij)2qB + (1− p0) (1− p) (BGij) (qB+qG)
+ (1− p0) p(GGij) (qB+qG)≥ p0(1− p) (BBBG)2qB+p
0
p(GBBG)2qB
+(1− p0) (1− p) (BGBG) (qB+qG)+ (1− p0) p(GGBG) (qB+qG)
[4] (1− p0) (GGGG)2qG+p0(GGBG) (qB+qG)≥ (1− p0) (ijGG)2qG
+p0(ijBG) (qB+qG)
[40] (1− p0) (GGij)2qG+p0(GBij) (qB+qG)≥ (1− p0) (GGGG)2qG
+p0(GBGG) (qB+qG)

⇔
n
(ijkl) = 
∗,∀ (i, j, k, l) ∈ S2
o
.
The system above defined a contract
¡
C0TTE
¢
.
The lower bound for achieving the ETE is  ≥ 2qGqB+qG
³

 ≥ 2qGqB+qG
´
and
corresponds to the case ∗ = 12 . Since
2qG
qB+qG
> 1, we get the impossibility result
stated in proposition 10.
Proof of Proposition 9. It is easy to check that the following strategies form a
pooling equilibrium of our game: workers always play a1 = (G,B) and a2 = (B,G)
where the beliefs in equilibrium and out of the equilibrium are assumed to be the
same as the prior beliefs. In equilibrium:  (a1, a2) = , so that theETE is attained
for  ≥ M ≡ Max
n
qˆG
(qB+qˆG)
; qˆG(1−)(qB+qˆG)
o³

 >M
´
when a team has (not)
been formed at time 0, where qˆG = wqG + (1−w) qB with w = pGpG+ppB . This
pooling equilibrium, being uninformative, is equivalent to an equilibrium obtained
in the absence of a revelation mechanism in which at time 0 workers decide on an
allocation rule  for sharing the group outcome at the end of the first and second
periods.
Proof of Corollary 4. From proposition 9, we know that the lowest bound for
which the absence of a revelation mechanism leads to the ETE is 2qˆGqB+qˆG in the case
 = 12 . Then, for  ≥ 2qˆGqB+qˆG
³

 ≥ 2qˆGqB+qˆG
´
when a team has (not) been formed at
time 0, there exists no equilibria that dominate the no revelation mechanism equilib-
rium for  = 12 . However, for  <
2qˆG
qB+qˆG
³

 <
2qˆG
qB+qˆG
´
, the revelation mechanism
allows workers to achieve a more cooperative equilibrium in which both workers
are better-off. As explained in the main text, for  < 2qˆGqB+qˆG
³

 <
2qˆG
qB+qˆG
´
and
 = 12 teams are formed when signals are symmetric (w.p : pBB + pGG) in the
TTE whereas they are formed only when signals are symmetric and no biases have
occurred (w.p : (1− p)pBB + pGG) in the absence of a revelation game.
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Proof of Proposition 10. A TTE is such that ai = i,∀i ∈ {1, 2}. The
TTE associated to contract (C1TTE) leads to team formation for:
(1, 2) ∈ S2/ {{(B,B) ; (B,G)} ; {(G,B) ; (B,B)} ; {(G,B) ; (B,G)}}. The
contract is defined as follows in the case a team has been formed at time 0:
GBGB (qB + qG) ≥ qG,  (1− GBGB) (qB + qG) ≥ qB
GBBB (2qB) < qB, GBBG (2qB) < qB, BBBG (2qB) < qB
GBGG = GBGB, BGBG (qB + qG) ≥ qB
 (1− BGBG) (qB + qG) ≥ qG
BGBG = GGBG, GGGG (2qG) ≥ qG
 (1− GGGG) (2qG) ≥ qG, BBBB (2qB) ≥ qB
 (1− BBBB) (2qB) ≥ qB, ∀ (i, j, k, l) /∈ S0 , ijkl = 0

⇔

GBGB ∈
h
1
 − qB(qB+qG) , 1−
qB
(qB+qG)
i
, GBGG = GBGB
GBBB ∈
h
0, 12
h
, GBBG ∈
h
0, 12
h
, BBBG ∈
h
0, 12
h
BGBG ∈
h
qB
(qB+qG)
, qB(qB+qG) +
−1

i
, GGBG = BGBG
GGGG ∈
h
1
2 , 1− 12
i
, BBBB ∈
h
1
2 , 1− 12
i
∀ (i, j, k, l) /∈ S0 , ijkl = 0

(C1TTE)
Where:
S
0≡
½
(G,B,G,B) ; (G,B,G,G) ; (B,G,B,G) ; (G,G,B,G) ; (G,G,G,G) ;
(B,B,B,B) ; (B,B,B,G) ; (G,B,B,G) ; (G,B,B,B)
¾
The contract (C1TTE) leads to team formation with probability:³
pGG + pBG + pGB + pBB (1− p)2
´
. We consider an alternative TTE lead-
ing to team formation for (1, 2) ∈ S2/ {{(G,B) ; (B,G)}}. This equilibrium
defines the following contract:
⇔

GBGB ∈
h
1
 − qB(qB+qG) , 1−
1
2
i
⇒  ≥ qGqB+qG + 12
GBGG = GBBB = GBGB
GBBB ∈
h
0, 12
h
BGBG ∈
h
1
2 , 1− qG(qB+qG)
i
⇒  ≥ qGqB+qG + 12
GGBG = BBBG = BGBG
GGGG ∈
i
1
2 , 1− 12
h
, BBBB ∈
i
1
2 , 1− 12
h
∀ (i, j, k, l) /∈ S0 , ijkl = 0

(C1
0
TTE)
This contract leads to team formation for (1, 2) ∈ S2/ {{(G,B) ; (B,G)}}
as long as  ≥ qGqB+qG + 12 . To end the proof of proposition 10 we need to show that
there does not exist a contingent contract improving (C1
0
TTE) for  ≥ qGqB+qG +
1
2 . We show below how contingent contracts cannot achieve team formation for all
(1, 2) ∈ Z when  < 2qˆGqB+qˆG ; we denote:
Z ≡ {{(B,G) ; (B,G)} ; {(G,B) ; (G,B)} ; {(G,B) ; (B,G)}}. This is suffi-
cient to show that no contracts can dominate (C1
0
TTE) for  ≥ qGqB+qG + 12 . For
 < 2qˆGqB+qˆG team formation is obtained for all (1, 2) ∈ Z if the allocation
rule obtained when (1, 2) = {(B,G) ; (B,G)} is different from the one following
(1, 2) = {(G,B) ; (G,B)}. For this to be the case we need either:
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- Worker 1 plays a different action after 1 = (B,G) and 1 = (G,B)
whereas worker 2 plays the same action (a). Given
¡
XI,1,1,XI,2,1
¢
= 1 =
(B,G), and imposing team formation for all (1, 2) ∈ Z1 ⊂ Z, where Z1 ≡
{{(G,B) ; (B,G)} ; {(B,B) ; (B,G)}}, we need BGa = BBa = GBa. However,
for BGa = GBa no teams can be formed for both (1, 2) = {(G,B) ; (G,B)}
and (1, 2) = {(B,G) ; (B,G)} when  < 2qˆGqB+qˆG .
- Worker 2 plays a different action after 2 = (B,G) and 2 = (G,B)
whereas worker 1 plays the same action. Same reasoning than above to show that
team formation for all (1, 2) ∈ {{(G,B) ; (B,G)} ; {(G,B) ; (B,B)}} and all
(1, 2) ∈ {{(G,B) ; (G,B)} ; {(B,G) ; (B,G)}} is not possible for  < 2qˆGqB+qˆG .
- Worker 1 (2) plays a different action after 1 = (B,G) (2 = (B,G)) and
1 = (G,B) (2 = (G,B)). If we want teams to be formed for all (1, 2) ∈ Z2,
where Z2 ≡ {{(G,B) ; (B,G)} ; {(B,B) ; (B,G)} ; {(G,B) ; (B,B)}} then we
need to impose
BGBG = GBBG = BGBG. However, for BGBG = GBBG = BGBG team
formation is not possible for all (1, 2) ∈ {{(G,B) ; (G,B)} ; {(B,G) ; (B,G)}}
when team formation is imposed for all (1, 2) ∈ {{(G,B) ; (B,G)}}. If we
impose team formation only for the set:
(1, 2) ∈ {{(G,B) ; (B,B)} ; {(B,B) ; (B,G)}}, we can get team formation
as well for (XI,1,1,XI,2,1) ∈ {(G,B) ; (B,G)} as long as  ≥ qGqB+qG + 12 . As
a result, for  < qGqB+qG +
1
2 , the best contract is the best among (C
1
TTE) and
(C0TTE), and for  ≥ qGqB+qG + 12 , the best contract is the best among (C1
0
TTE) and
(C0TTE). For  <
qG
qB+qG
+ 12 , (C
1
TTE) dominates (C
0
TTE) if:
Probability of team formation at time 1 under (C1TTE)
>
Probability of team formation at time 1 under (C0TTE)

⇔ pB
¡
p2 − 2p¢+2pG> 0
Similarly, for  ≥ qGqB+qG+ 12 , (C1
0
TTE) dominates (C
0
TTE) if−pBp2+2pG > 0.
Proof of Corollary 5. The proof follows from proposition 13 since the best fixed
allocation rules contract is (C0TTE) for  <
2qˆG
qB+qˆG
. This contract is dominated
by contingent contracts respectively by (C1
0
TTE) and (C
1
TTE) for p <
q
2pG
pB
and
p (2− p) < 2pGpB where p (2− p) increases in p. The second part of the corollary
follows from the existence of an uninformative BPE based on fixed allocation rules
implementing the ETO for  ≥ 2qˆGqB+qˆG (proposition 12).
Proof of Proposition 11. The first part of the proposition follows from simple
algebra comparing the expected utility of a worker in the different cases. We consider
the case of symmetric contracts so that the expected utility of the two coworkers is
the same. This is the most favorable situation for the manager since it is the case in
which the expected payoffs for the worse coworker are maximum. The latter makes
conditions for hiring a manager less demanding. The symmetric case can be seen as a
natural consequence of the assumption of equal bargaining power among coworkers.
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The second part of the proposition is proved in the main text.
Appendix B
Subgame-perfect Nash equilibria of the standard game. In addition
to the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium stated in proposition 1, the other subgame-
perfect equilibria are as follows:
1- No workers form teams at time 1 and teams are formed for  ≥  at time 0.
2- No workers form teams at times 0 and 1.
3- Teams are formed at time 1 as stated in lemma 1 and no teams are formed at
time 0.
None of the equilibria mentioned above is strict since they involve weakly domi-
nated strategies. In addition they involve strategies that prevent any cooperation in
at least one of the two periods.
Bayesian Perfect equilibria: non-observability of other’s perfor-
mance outside the team. We assume that workers cannot observe other’s
performance when they do not form a team. We consider the case in which the two
workers decide simultaneously either to form a team or to work alone. The agreement
of the two workers is necessary for team formation. As established in proposition 1,
at time 0, teams are always formed for  ≥ . Thresholds for team formation when
no teams have been formed at time 0 are always higher than . That is for  < , if
no teams are formed at time 0, no teams will be formed at time 1. We can conclude
that the conditions for team formation at time 0 in the case of non-observability of
other’s performance outside the team are identical to the case of observable outcomes.
Any BPE has to satisfy the following condition: if  <  a worker does not form a
team at time 1 if no teams have been formed at time 0. Indeed, it is easy to check
that whatever the history of signals considered the strategy consisting of forming a
team for  <  cannot be a mutual best response to one’s coworker strategy. This is
so since for  <  a worker knows that his coworker accepts to form a team only if he
receives bad news. The model is then solved as in the standard case. The conditions
for team formation at time 0 only depend on the thresholds for team formation when
a team has been formed at time 0, since these conditions do not change with respect
to the model with observable signals: propositions 1 and 2 are not modified.
The equilibria of the game are as follows: at time 1 the conditions for team
formation are given by lemma 1 if a team has been formed at time 0. If no teams
have been formed at time 0, we get the following equilibria at time 1:
- Equilibrium 1
For  < , workers will decide to work alone whatever the history of signals,
beliefs in equilibrium are the prior beliefs: µj = pB,∀j ∈ {1, 2}, where µj is
the belief of worker j about i0s (j 6= i) receiving a low payoff (B) at time 1. For
 ≤  < 2∗ ≡ 21+ 
+1
, workers will form a team at time 1 if the signals received
are both failures, beliefs in equilibrium are as follows: µj = 1,∀j ∈ {1, 2}. For
 ≥ 21+ 
+1
, agents will work as a team at time 1 whatever the history of signals,
beliefs in equilibrium are the prior beliefs.
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- Equilibrium 2
Assuming a team has not been formed at time 0, the conditions for team for-
mation at time 1 are as follows: for  < , workers will decide to work alone
whatever the history of signals, beliefs in equilibrium are the prior beliefs. For
 ≤  < 2
1+ 
+
++1
+1
, workers will form a team at time 1 if the signals received
are both failures, µj = 1,∀j ∈ {1, 2}. For  ≥ 21+ 
+
++1
+1
, agents will work as
a team at time 1 whatever the history of signals, beliefs in equilibrium are the prior
beliefs.
- Equilibrium 3: mixed strategies equilibrium.
Appendix C
Specification of an alternative model: no learning by doing effect.
The only difference with the standard model is that  = 1 and a cost C > 0 is
incurred by both coworkers when they decide to shift from one type of project to
another.
Conditions for team formation at time 1:
Assuming a team has been formed at time 0, the condition for team formation
at time 1 for worker i are as follows:
Consider the case (XI,1,1;XI,2,1) = (G;G), the condition for team forma-
tion is identical for both workers and is given by:  ≥ 1 − C ++1+1 ≡ g. For
(XI,1,1;XI,2,1) ∈ {(G;B) ; (B;G)}, a team will be formed if:  ≥ +1+1/2 −
C ++1+1/2 ≡ bg. For (XI,1,1;XI,2,1) = (B;B), the condition for team forma-
tion is the same for both agents:  ≥ 1 − C ++1 ≡ b. If a team has not been
formed at time 0 the thresholds for team formation are: 
0
g ≡ 1 + C ++1+1 , 
0
bg ≡
+1
+1/2 +C
++1
+1/2 and 
0
b ≡ 1 +C ++1 .
Conditions for team formation at time 0:
Case 1: C ≥ qG so that: b ≤ bg ≤ g ≤ 0g ≤ 0bg ≤ 
0
b. The condition for
team formation in that case is  ≥ 1.
Case 2: C < 12(++1)(2+1) so that: b ≤ g ≤ 
0
g < bg ≤ 0bg ≤ 
0
b
For  < g, no teams are formed.
For g ≤  < 0g, teams are formed for  ≥
2(2+++2+/2)+2C(+2+)
2(2+++2+/2)
≡
ΓA > 1
For 
0
g ≤  < bg, the condition for team formation is  ≥ 0G. That is for case
2, the condition for team formation at time 0 is such that:  ≥Min
n
ΓA, 
0
g
o
> 1
Case 3: 12(++1)(2+1) ≤ C < qG so that: b ≤ g < bg ≤ 
0
g ≤ 0bg ≤ 
0
b,
the conditions for team formation at time 0 are such that:½
 ≥ ΓA for ΓA < BG
 ≥ 1 otherwise
¾
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It follows from the thresholds for team formation at time 0 that team with positive
synergies may not be formed some range of values of C and . This result is in line
with proposition 1.
Appendix D
Specification of an alternative model: assumption 2c’ (full aware-
ness of biases). We modify our standard model assuming that agents are fully
aware of their biases at time 1 (assumption 2c
0
) and considering that with probability
x no news {∅} are received at time 1.
Conditions for team formation at time 1 after a team has (not) been formed at
time 0
Signals Probability Threshold
(B,B)
·
pBB (1− x)2 (1−Π)
pBB (1− x)2Π
¸ ·
 ≥ 1 ()
 ≥ )∗
¡
2)∗
¢¸
(∅;B); (B;∅) pBx (1− x)  ≥ )∗
¡
2)∗
¢
(B,G); (G,B) pBpG (1− x)2  ≥ ∗
¡
2∗
¢
(G,G) pGG (1− x)2  ≥ 1 ()
(∅;G); (G;∅) pGx (1− x)  ≥ )∗∗
¡
2)∗∗
¢
(∅;∅) x2  ≥ 1 ()
Where pB (pBB) is the probability of receiving one (two) bad signals a priori.
The same notation applies to good signals. We denote: )∗ ≡ 2qˆB(qˆB+qB) and )∗∗ ≡
2qG
(qˆB+qG)
where qˆB = x
0
qB+
³
1− x0
´
q∗, where x0 = P [XI,i,1 = B | ii = ∅] =
ppB
ppB+x
,∀i ∈ {1, 2} and ii is the signal perceived at time 1 by worker i about his
own ability.
Conditions for team formation at time 0:
Case 1: 1 ≤  ≤ )∗ ≤ )∗∗ ≤ ∗ ≤ 2)∗ ≤ 2)∗∗ ≤ 2∗ . For  < 1 no
teams are formed. For 1 ≤  < , teams are formed for:  ≥ ¯1,Π.
¯1,Π≡ (1+)W−[x(1−x)(++1)+(1−x)
2(2+1)+Π2(1−x)2+x(1−x)((+)(+1)+(++1))]
W+((+1)(1−x)2+x2(+2+2)+(1−Π)2(1−x)2)
where W = (+ ) (+  + 1) , 1 < ¯1,Π ≤  and ∂¯1,Π∂Π > 0.
For  ≥ , teams are always formed.
For Case 2: 1 ≤ )∗ <  ≤ )∗∗ ≤ ∗ ≤ 2)∗ ≤ 2)∗∗ ≤ 2∗
Case 3: 1 ≤ )∗ ≤ )∗∗ <  ≤ ∗ ≤ 2)∗ ≤ 2)∗∗ ≤ 2∗ and Case
4: 1 ≤ )∗ ≤ )∗∗ ≤ ∗ <  ≤ 2)∗ ≤ 2)∗∗ ≤ 2∗ , the only threshold
for team formation at time 0 that depends on Π is: ¯1,Π. It follows from the
previous information and from
∂¯1,Π
∂Π > 0 a result similar to proposition 2: if rational
coworkers decide not to form a team at time 0, coworkers suffering from self-serving
biases will not form a team at time 0 neither.
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